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RECENT TRENDS IN TRANSPORT RATE

REGULATION
Leonard S. Goodman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T the close of the 1960's, the Interstate Commerce Commission
was attacked from several quarters. One of the more lengthy
studies of fts work was performed by a group of students under the
direction of Robert C. Fellmeth and Ralph Nader. Other regulatory
agencies were visited by similar groups organized by Mr. Nader; and
"Nader's Raiders" became a familiar newspaper phrase. The bulky
Study Group Report resulting from their inquiry into the Commission's achievements was published in 1970 under the title The Interstate Commerce Omission: The Public Interest and the ICC.1
The authors did not mince words in expressing their displeasure
with the Commission's work. The chapter concerning freight rate
regulation they entitled "The Rate Rape."2 This chapter followed
nearly 150 pages of invective. Within its pages, a reader would find
no discussion of the Commission's accomplishments in the field of
rate regulation. Ironically, the title of the book seemed to describe
the authors' apparently conscious effort to publish with omissions.
The simplistic picture of rate regulation presented in the Report
overlooked the complexity of the Commission's responsibilities. The
prices for transportation service in interstate commerce are reflected
in millions of rates, each of which applies for the carriage of particularized commodities between named points. These rates are on file
with the ICC, but only a few were established, or prescribed, by the
Commission. Furthermore, the railroads, the truckers, and other
modes of transportation regulated by the ICC typically file 300,000
new tariffs each year. Few of these tariffs are contested, and but a
handful become the subject of formal proceedings.3 Even so, there

A

• Associate General Counsel, Interstate Commerce Commission. B.A. 1954, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.-Ed. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Interstate Commerce Commission or its Office of General Counsel.
1. THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM•
MISSION AND TRANSPORTATION, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPoRT].

2. Id. at 126-90.
3. 85 ICC ANN. REP. 3 (1971). However, when general rate increases that may affect
a large number of rates for many carriers are filed, the Commission normally will require formal proceedings.
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were still approximately 1,000 rate proceedings before the Commission in fiscal 1971.4
What these statistics reflect is the often-forgotten fact that the
interstate rate structure has always been basically a system of "carriermade" rates. When regulation began, the Commission had no ratefixing authority. 5 Today such broad authority exists; but the basic
duties under the Interstate Commerce Act remain those of the carriers: to file and th~reby publicize the rates they hold out to the public, and to maintain just and reasonable rates. 6
Despite this partial autonomy in the carriers, the trend in their
rate structure has tended more and more to a cost orientation. This
is illustrated by the comparison below of revenues and out-of-pocket
costs of the different commodity groups:
RAno OF RAILROAD REvENUES
TO OUT-OF-POCKET Cosrs7

Commodity Group

1939

Products of agriculture
Animals and products

135
125

Products of mines
Products of forests
Mfg. and misc.

153
203

106
132
127
165

Total carloads

1'72

141

178

1947

1961

121

118
111
10'7
11'7

149
128

The movement followed the direction of cost-pricing for reasons
quite apart from the ICC's regulation of rates. Increasing competition among the modes of transportation and new methods of packing
determined the trend; the Commission, at most, molded its contours.
The object of this Article is to describe the trends in the Commission's work during the 1960's in some of the areas of rate regulation that could not be settled by mere reference to costs, and in other
areas of changing rate policy. This was a prolific period for the Commission, one that involved many rate innovations and a sense of new
direction in certain aspects of rate regulation. The present discussion of the Commission's rate work is in no sense complete; and there
is no intention to make it so. By emphasizing the decisions of the
recent decade, I hope to introduce the reader to the substance and
4. Id. Table 1, at 105.
5. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
6. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4), 1(5), 6, 316, 905, 906, 1004 (1970).
7. See ICC Bureau of Accounts, Distribution of the Rail Revenue Contribution ny
Commodity Groups-1961, Statement No. 6-64, at 3 Oune 1964); ICC Bureau of Accounts, Distribution of the Rail Overhead Burden By Commodity Groups-1939 &: 1947,
Statement No. 2-49, at 9 (April 1949).
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trend of the more controversial aspects of today's regulation of freight
rates. There will be no discussion, of course, of matters still pending
before the Commission. Nevertheless, the very substantial pending
investigations of the railroad rate structure8 and of the railroad rate
base0 further attest to the vitality of rate regulation today.
II.

THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN VALUE OF SERVICE

The Study Group Report includes a particularly harsh vilification of the Commission's adherence to "value of service" rates and
rate-making over the years. It finds this theory of rates, which calls
for reduced rates on low-value commodities and correspondingly
higher rates on high-value commodities, responsible for a host of
weaknesses in the railroad industry and in the economy of the country.10 The Report suggests that value of service perhaps assisted in
the development of the West, but that today a departure by the rate
maker from "considerations of cost" is unfair and uneconomic.11
Since the rate structure is largely the product of carrier-made rates,
let us first turn to the factors impelling carrier management to employ value of service. The rate structure, it is true, includes elements
of value-of-service pricing. However, can we assume, as the Study
Group Report seems to do, that these elements are present only as a
result of ICC policy? Or does the very nature of value-of-service
pricing ensure that the rate structure will contain an irreducible
minimum of such rates?

A. By Carrier Management
The value-of-service principle is basically a procedure for distributing elements of cost. It is derived from transport economics, not
social policy.12 Professor Sharfman ·wrote that value of service, when
properly used, was the appropriate principle under which the "total
costs" were apportioned to the various classes of traffic all "to the
end that movement of tonnage may be promoted." He stated that
"the problem is essentially one of apportioning the total cost burden," and only "maladjustments in the apportionment of transporta8. Investigation of Railroad Freight Rate Structure, Ex parte No. 270 (I.C.C., initiated Dec. 11, 1970).
9. Net Investment Railroad Rate Base, Ex parte No. 271 (I.C.C., initiated Dec. II,
1970).
10. STUDY GROuP R.EPoRT, supra note 1, at 146-54.
11. Id.
12. On the other hand, there is nothing inherently fair about charging the same rate
per hundred pounds for high-valued cargo, which can readily afford a higher rate, and,
let us say, scrap or fertilizer.
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tion costs create the necessity for regulation." 13 Thus he recognized
that although certain variable costs were assignable to specific traffic, there was no one obviously correct method for apportioning the
constant or joint costs. As the staff of the Commission has written,
"there is no justification from a 'cost of service' standpoint for
apportioning any more of these joint costs to any one unit of output
resulting from the joint operation than to any other unit of output
from the same operation."14 The staff therefore concluded that "the
distribution of the constant and joint costs must take into consideration the value of the service or conditions of demand."16
The railroads were of the same view as the Commission's staff, but
perhaps for different reasons. During the nineteenth century, they
recognized the many choices available in apportioning the constant
and joint costs. At the same time, they perceived an opportunity to
maximize their profits by promoting the movement of traffic. As a
result, by reducing some rates while at the same time retaining high
rates on traffic willing to pay such rates, the railroads were able to
attract traffic that would not othenvise move, at least not by rail.
Professor Daggett, therefore, defined value of service in terms
of a theory of demand; that is, what would a shipper be "willing
to pay." He inferred a greater "utility" of transportation in the
higher price any particular purchaser of transportation would pay.10
Similarly, Professor Locklin defines the phrase "value of service''
as "the highest charge that can be levied without preventing a shipment from moving."17
Criticizing this ability of the railroads to price their services differentially, the Study Group Report asserts that value-of-service pricing reflects only monopoly power; but it also concedes that the "railroads supported the structure because it ma."illllized profits."18 In its
invective, the Report apparently overlooks the fact that profit-ma.ximizing is rational decision-making behavior, and not necessarily a
13. ill-B L SHARFMAN, THE lNTERsTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 440-42 (1936). See
also R. WE5I'MEYER, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 244-45 (1952). Sharfman pointed
out that to apply properly value-of-service pricing there must be an independent de•
termination of the desirable amount of transportation services. III-B I. SHARF.MAN,
supra, at 427-29.
14. ICC Bureau of Accounts, Cost Finding and Valuation Section, Explanation of
the Development of Motor Carrier Costs with Statement as to Their Meaning and
Significance, Statement No. 4-59, at 12 (Aug. 1959).
15. Id. at 14.
16. S. DACGEIT, PRINCIPLES OF INLAND TRANSPORTATION 363 (1928).
17. D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 146 (6th ed. 1966).
18. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 148.

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1229

sign that monopoly profits are being made. Moreover, the Report
fails to comprehend that in the presence of a regulated monopoly,
value of service can make economic sense. In an article published in
1962, ten well-known economists strongly supported the railroads'
system of differential pricing.19 Among their words of encouragement were the following:
Differential pricing is consistent with the public interest in the
economical utilization of resources. It can yield significant benefits
to the users of rail services by encouraging the retention of traffic
and the development of greater traffic volumes and improved profits,
thus fostering the adoption of improved technology and service, as
well as lower rates.20
Value-of-service pricing exists to the extent that it does essentially
by consent. It exists under the rate agreements among the carriers.
They recognize that by this means they are able to increase utilization and profits.21 The existence of value-of-service pricing, therefore, would possibly work less well in the absence of the price-fixing
permitted by section 5a22 of the Interstate Commerce Act; but it
would not disappear. The railroads surely would recognize that it
is self-defeating, with respect to maximizing their profits and utilizing their facilities to the fullest, to drive all above-average rates
down toward cost and all below-average rates up to a full-cost level.
The freight-rate structure today reflects less value of service than
it did prior to World War II. Nevertheless, the concept is still highly
relevant in the efforts of carrier management to maximize profits.

B. By the ICC
What we have seen is that there are sound economic reasons for
carrier management to retain the value-of-service principle in the
rate structure. What is more, the statute administered by the ICC
also gives recognition to this principle. Section 6(1)23 of the Inter19. Baumol, Bonbright, Brozen, Dean, Edwards, Hoover, Pegrum, Roberts, Williams &: Behling, The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35
J. Bus. U. Cm. 357 (1962).
20. Id. at 363.
21. Curiously, the Report recognizes that value-of-service pricing was a "highly
beneficial" part of the nineteenth century rate structure, and yet concludes without
citation that the railroads' failure to adhere to cost was the precise type of "discrimination" that the Commission was "originally formed to prevent." STUDY GROUP REPORT,
supra note 1, at 147-48, 169.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970).
23. 49 u.s.c. § 6(1) (1970).
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state Commerce Act requires the railroads to file tariffs with the
Commission that set forth not only the transportation rates, but
also any rules and regulations affecting the value of service. The
Act specifically requires the Commission to consider "the effect of
rates on the movement of traffic" when it prescribes rates. 24 This
seems to imply that some rates should be set lower than others on
grounds other than cost considerations.
The references to value of service in the provisions of the statute
governing motor carriers are more numerous. Both the tariff-filing
section and a rate-making section of the statute include specific
references to "value of service."25 At the same time, the statute
preserves the reference to the effect of rates on the movement of
traffic. 26 The motor carrier provisions in Part II27 of the Act in fact
reflect the accumulated experience incurred under Part I, 28 which
applies to railroads. In addition, both parts of the Act require railroads and motor carriers to establish and observe reasonable "classifications" of property; 29 this requirement is at least an oblique
reference to the value of the service.
The Study Group Report implies that the Commission, through
its approval of rates reflecting the value of the service, gives the railroads and other carriers a free rein to establish whatever rates the
traffic will bear; 30 but the Commission early resolved that rates established under value-of-service principles would not be permitted to find
their own level completely divorced from regulation. That is to
say, the Commission did not equate "value of service" with "what
the traffic would bear." Rather, it attempted to impose "governmental limitations ... upon the unlimited and arbitrary discretion
of traffic officials."31 A few illustrations of the Commission's work
and of some of the criteria developed in bringing value-of-service
pricing to bear would perhaps best illustrate this last point.
24. 49 U.S.C. § l!fa(2) (1970).
25. 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 317(c), 318(a) (1970).
26. 49 U.S.C. § 316(i). The water carrier and the freight fonvarder sections of the
Act also prohibit the carrier's extension of "any privileges or facilities for transportation affecting the value thereof except such as are specified in its tariff." 49 U.S.C.
§§ 906(c), 1006(c) (1970).
27. 49 u.s.c. §§ 301-27 (1970).
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-5, 5b-27 (1970).
29. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1(6), 316(b) (1970).
30. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 148-49.
31. Railroad Com.nm. of Nevada v. Southern l'ac. Co., 19 I.C.C. 238, 249 (1910). The
Commission was governed by "what the traffic can reasonably be required to bear"; the
Commission has "never recognized" that charging what the traffic will bear "has any
place in public regulation." Mountain-Pacific Oil Cases, 192 I.C.C. 599, 636 (1933).

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation
I.

1231

Cost Considerations

The issue of value of service has been raised explicitly in only a
few cases. Thus it is easy to overemphasize the role of value of service,
as the Study Group Report constantly does. Furthermore, the Report wholly fails to consider that when the Commission was presented
with a value-of.service question and given a choice to follow cost
or value-of-service considerations, it followed the rule that favored
lower rates. For example, the value of one commodity might be
higher than that of another related commodity; but, if the average
loadings of the former were substantially higher, the Commission
would not necessarily require a proportionately higher rate for the
more valuable commodity.32

2. Differential Between a Raw Material and Its Product
One area of controversy over the effects of value-of-service pricing
has involved shippers of a particular raw material and those handling
the final product. In 1932, the Commission prescribed a maximum
rate on rough stone and a minimum rate on dressed stone, finding
that a lesser differential between the two would unduly prejudice
shippers of rough stone.33 On the other hand, it refused to require
a differential between wheat and flour,34 and eventually prescribed
equal rates for the two commodities.35 In the Commission's view,
flour-milling added relatively little value to the raw material.

3. Differential Between a Commodity
and Its Related Scrap or Waste
In some of its early cases, the Commission held that the rates
should not differentiate between new and used articles,36 and, for
32. Official Classification Rating"S, 37 I.C.C. 166, 183 (1915); Straw Rates from St.
Louis, Mo. to Anderson, Ind., 36 I.C.C. 30 (1915). This course was not followed when
the proposed rates were below out-of-pocket costs or undermined an inherent cost advantage of a competing mode of transportation. The Commission's regulation of intermodal competition in recent years has perhaps overshadowed other important work of
the Commission. See pt. VIII infra.
33. O'Meara v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 183 I.C.C. 3 (1932). See also Builders' Assn. v.
Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 190 I.C.C. 221 (1932). In Young v. Chicago I. & L. Ry., 89 I.C.C.
428 (1924), the Commission refused to prescribe a differential where the rates were apparently depressed on both commodities. Similarly, in Crown Willamette Paper Co.
v. Director General, 78 I.C.C. 273 (1923), it refused to prescribe a differential where the
manufactured item was subject to competition and the raw material was not.
34. Grain & Grain Products, 164 I.C.C. 619, 652-53 (1930).
35. Grain To, From & Within S. Territory, 259 I.C.C. 629, 783 (1945). See also George
A. Hormel & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 263 I.C.C. 9, 39-40 (1945); Eastern Livestock
Cases of 1926, 144 I.C.C. 731, 740-41 (1928).
36. Wiessbaum & Co. v. Director General, 53 I.C.C. 681 (1919); Cal Hirsch & Sons
Iron & Rail Co. v. Washington, B. & A. Elec. R.R., 26 I.C.C. 480 (1913).
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the most part, these precedents have been followed. 37 However, when
a commodity, such as old burlap bag-s, was so worn that it was suitable only for conversion into fiber, then a lower rate has been required.38 Furthermore, since the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1968,39 new emphasis has been placed
on the differentials properly to be accorded scrap and waste
materials. 40

4.

Use to Which a Product Is Put Is Not Controlling

The primary use to which a product is put often determines its
character for transportation purposes no less than for nontransportation purposes. The carrier as rate maker may not be able to identify
a product divorced from its use. In such a case, a product's primary
use properly may provide the basis for a particular rate, rather than
another rate, by comparison with the rates in effect on products
similar to the primary use, rather than the rates in effect on products
similar to a secondary use.41
However, the Commission has often struck down differentials
between essentially the same products when the only distinction
drawn by the carrier was in the use to which the product was put
at that time. The article's use at any given moment might not re.
main the same, and might in any event have no relation to the
transportation characteristics of a shipment of such articles.4 2 If,
37. Condenser Serv, &: Engr. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 296 I.C.C. 495 (1955);
Vacuum Cleaner Mfrs. Assn. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. Co., 276 I.C.C. 783 (1950).
38. Coastal Bag &: Bagging Corp. v. Texas &: N.O.R.R., 277 I.C.C. 789 (1950); Aaron
Ferer &: Sons v. Belt Ry., 151 I.C.C. 197 (1929),
39. P.L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970)),
40. See, e.g., Increased Freight Rates, 1970 &: 1971, 339 I.C.C. 125, 201-09 (1971),
appeal docketed sub nom. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States, No. 806-72, D.C. Cir. (environmental issues).
41. A single or unique use may determine the character of an article. A rate may
be premised on this use if the article is thereby clearly distinguishable from competing
commodities. Ranger Joe, Inc. v. Biter's Transfer, Inc., 54 M.C.C. 587,590 (1952): Glenn
L. Martin Co. v. W.T. Cowan, Inc., 44 M.C.C 726, 728 (1945). The predominant use of
an article determines its character for transportation purposes. Classification Rating of
De-icer Truck Spray, 326 I.C.C. 389, 396 (1966), afjd. sub nom, Seaboard Air Line R.R.
v. United States, 387 F.2d 651 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
42. Davis v. West Jersey Express Co., 16 I.C.C. 214, 216 (1909). Lower rates on coal
for steam railroad use but not for use of electric railroads or for shippers generally
were disapproved under sections 2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 2-3 (1970), in Restricted Rates, 20 I.C.C. 426 (1911), afjd. sub nom. ICC v. Baltimore
&: O.R.R., 225 U.S. 326 (1912). See also Apache Powder Co. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry.,
299 I.C.C. 649 (1957) (rates on low-grade nitrates used for explosives and on nitrates
used for fertilizer): Limestone Mixtures &: Grits Within Official Territory, 280 I.C.C.
367, 373 (1951) (rates on ground limestone put to different uses): American Salpa Corp.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 179 I.C.C. 195 (1931) (rates on scrap leather used for fertilizer and
other scrap leather).
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on the other hand, the use to which the item is put drastically alters
its value, a higher rate would be permitted on the product than on
the ingredient, even though only the use has changed and not its
nature or properties.43

5. Long-Term Depressed Conditions in an Industry
During the Depression the Commission gave considerable weight
to the prevailing low prices and distressed conditions in individual
industries.44 Nevertheless, rate increases were allowed in response
to clearly proven revenue requirements.45 The Commission also
held that depressed conditions over the short term did not justify
rate reductions,46 and conversely that shipper prosperity was no basis
for a rate increase.47
6. Applying Value-of-Service Principles
The principles developed in these decisions only presented a
partial solution to the Commission's problem of controlling arbitrary
pricing by rate-making carriers. The more difficult problems were
met when the Commission translated these criteria into distinct measures of value of service, and ultimately info rates for the future or
damages for the past.
Since relatively few cases were presented for decision, the Commission could uniformly begin with some elementary rules. For example, if the considered commodity has a wide range in value, the
average or prevailing value will be used to determine the rate.48
43. See C.B. Fleet Co. v. Aberdeen & R.R.R., 287 I.C.C. 89 (1952) (phosphate and
soda sold as a laxative considered a medicine, rather than a chemical); Laboratory
Products Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 168 I.C.C. 681 (1930) (condensed milk considered
a prepared food); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 168 I.C.C. 157
(1930) (maltose given a higher rate when used as a prepared food).
44. General Commodity Rate Increases, 1937, 223 I.C.C. 657, 679, 683-84, 740-46
(1937) (coal); Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 215 I.C.C. 439, 464-65 (1936); Class
Rates Within Ga., 209 I.C.C. 586, 589 (1935); Thomas Keery Co., Inc. v. New York,
0. & W. Ry., 206 I.C.C. 585, affd., 211 I.C.C. 451, 455 (1935) (wood alcohol); Industrial
Sand Cases, 1930, 204 I.C.C. 159, 164-65 (1934).
45. Fifteen Percent Case, 1937-38, 226 I.C.C. 41, 105-06 (1938).
46. Livestock-Western Dist. Rates, 190 I.C.C. 611, 629, 633, 643 (1933).
47. Increased Ry. Rates, Fares & Charges, 1942, 255 I.C.C. 357, 396-403 (1943) (concurring opinion); Rubber Assn. of America v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 174 I.C.C. 79, 84
(1931). See also Empire Steel Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 281 I.C.C. 512 (1951) (longterm increases in value of scrap prices).
48. United States Potters' Assn. v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 172 I.C.C. 618 (1931); Auto
Specialties Mfg. Co. v. Chesapeake &: O. Ry., 279 I.C.C. 245 (1950). :tower rates were,
however, then prescribed where the value of the considered commodity was well below
the average. E.g., Basic Refractories, Inc. v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 296 I.C.C. 345 (1955);
Hill &: Griffith Co. v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 294 I.C.C. 619 (1955).
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Value of service is typically measured by comparing the rates on the
commodities under consideration with those charged for similar
commodities moving benveen the same, or perhaps even different,
points. Similarly, a customary relationship bet\veen the rates on the
considered commodity and other rates is a particularly useful measure of the value of service.49
While these general rules are useful in setting rates for newly
shipped commodities, they leave unanswered a fundamental question. Each one of these measures presupposes that the existing rates
have been created on a reasonable estimate of value of service; which,
in conjunction with the fact that existing rates are largely carriermade, presupposes a reasonable exercise of judgment by carrier management.
The uniform freight classifications,60 for example, filed by the
railroads and by the motor carriers, reflect an elaborate consideration
of value of service, but the basis for these classifications does not
necessarily lie in precise mathematical principles. The motor carrier
industry appears to consider wholesale values in establishing freight
classifications; but the weight given to any one factor will vary with
transportation conditions.61 The Commission has described the problem of fixing class rates62 ~ one requiring it
to establish a sufficiently ·wide range of rates which may be assigned
to the general run of commodities, i.e., those that are not affected by
special and unusual transportation conditions, in some degree of
harmony with the value of the service rendered,li 3

The railroads, too, have not converted value of service into
acceptable arithmetic terms. At the tum of the century, the chairman of the railroads' Western Classification Committee, J.T. Ripley,
assigned ratings based upon "units." These units were functions of
the value (in dollars) per 100 pounds and the volume (in cubic feet)
per 100 pounds of a commodity. The formula was expressed in the
49. Livestock-Western Dist. Rates, 176 I.C.C. 1, 43-44, 68-69 (1931).
50. For a description of uniform freight classification and freight tariffs, sec D.
LOCKLIN, supra note 17, at 158-69.
51. See J. COLQUnT, THE ART AND DEVELOPMENT OF FREIGHT CI.AssIFJCATION 77, 247,
268 (1956).
52. Most freight traffic moves under "point to point" commodity rates. A relatively
small percentage (perhaps 10% to 15%) moves under class rates, which arc assigned to
commodities of like description and which are applicable within wide regions of the
country. Such rates are ordinarily the highest rates that may be considered reasonable
for a commodity. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 I.C.C. 503, 506-07
(1964); Page Belting Co. v. Boston&: M.R.R., 294 I.C.C. 307, 308-09 (1955).
53. Southern Class Rate Investigation, 100 I.C.C. 513, 646 (1925).
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+ 100," where V is the value per
w

pound of a commodity (in dollars) and W the weight per cubic foot. 54'
It was subsequently shown that the Ripley units were related to the
ratings linearly, through the equation "Rating= 36.71 3.5104
(Unit)."65 Thus the rating increased in proportion to the increase
in units, and units increased directly with value and inversely with
the weight. The Commission, in an early period, referred to the
Ripley units, which were "intended to express the relation to one
another of weight, space, and value," as constituting "a basis for
comparison with other articles" and an aid in establishing a fair
classification system among articles.56 But this method has long since
been discarded. 51
The motor freight industry proposed its own classification formula for all carriers in Class Rate Investigation, 1939. 58 This scheme
involved a "Value-Density" table and certain "mean rating factors." 59
Ratings were assigned as follows: 60

+

Commodity
llasic raw materials &
unprocessed farm products
Processed farm products
Industrial materials
llasic necessaries
Partial necessaries
Industrial equipment
Luxuries and accessories

Rating Percentage
85
90

95
100

105
110
115

Despite this "Value-Density" scheme, the Commission found that
the foregoing ratings "represent the judgment of proponents and
are not derived from any test." 61 The Commission adopted the rail
carriers' position that no formula could be derived and that the
classification committees of the railroads might act "on their opinion
54. ll. Aitchison, Weight Density and Value as Factors in Freight Classification,
ICC llureau of Transport Economics 8: Statistics, Statement No. 469, at 34 (March 1946).
55. Id.
56. Suspension of W. Classification No. 51, I.C.C. No. 9, 25 I.C.C. 442, 452 (1912).
57. ll. Aitchison, supra note 54, at 33.
58. 262 I.C.C. 447, 496-501 (1945).
59. 262 I.C.C. at 499.
60. 262 I.C.C. at 500.
61. 262 I.C.C. at 500. The Commission rejected the formula for use by rail carriers,
whose ratings were in issue, upon finding that it was "designed for package freight
only, but does not distinguish between the containers used or the manner of packing,
and makes no real provision for articles of great weight density or high value, nor, of
course, for bulk freight." 262 I.C.C. at 501.
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that the importance of value and density in the classification of
articles is not and cannot be determined by any fixed rule." 62
In view of the difficulties encountered by the carriers in measuring value of service, the Commission's refusal to establish or adopt
a value-of-service formula is understandable. Moreover, shippers'
complaint remedies remain intact as carrier rates remain carriermade, consistent with the over-all plan of Congress in enacting the
Interstate Commerce Act.
The value-of-service rates were still subject to limitations of
public policy, and could be found detrimental to the public interest
in individual cases. The Study Group Report urges that this position
was not strong enough, and that the Commission somehow should
have taken a more active role in removing value-of-service elements
from the rate structure.63 Was such a role advisable? It was, if we
assume with the Study Group Report that any tolerance of value of
service in the carrier-made rates rendered the Commission an accomplice to uneconomic practices and excessive rates. What then have
been the practical effects of value-of-service pricing?
III.

THE EFFECTS OF

VALUE·OF-SERVICE

RA.TES

The Study Group Report condemns value-of-service pricing with
the observation that such a system of rates "involves the perpetuation of fundamental misallocations of resources, which a competitive
industry would not allow." 64 Without competition, the Report suggests, there is no incentive for railroads to eliminate unneeded capacity. Thus value-of-service pricing, according to the Report, has the net
effect of providing "more transportation, or more transportation
cost, than is necessary." 65 The cost of this "transportation inefficiency" is passed on to the shippers, particularly long-distance shippers and the shipp.ers of high-valued goods.66 The Report notes:
One stated impact of the present value-of-service system has been
rising overcapacity, particularly for the railroads. Since overcapacity
means inefficiency and higher cost, the effects of this factor are reflected in across the board price increases and inefficiencies.67

The Report apparently suggests that the ICC should end its policies
62. 262 I.C.C. at 487.

63. See
64.
65.
66.
67.

STUDY GROUP REPORT,

Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.

supra note 1, at 147-54.

June 1972]

1237"

Transport Rate Regulation

of value-of-service pricing and "enforcement of excessive profits
for certain commodities." 68
True enough, the Commission policy has long called for a reduction in the intramodal competition that the authors of the Study
Group Report find desirable. This course has been followed because
the Commission's experience demonstrates that gross inefficiencies
would othenvise result. In the eyes of the Commission, the intramodal competition proposed by the Study Group would mean duplication of facilities and inefficient use of existing facilities, and would
in no way help to alleviate the plight of railroads in financial trouble. 69 On the other hand, the policies behind the Interstate Commerce Act, which are complemented by value-of-service pricing, are
intended to promote greater utilization of existing facilities by encouraging the unification of facilities. 70 The Commission's success in
fulfilling these goals may to some extent be measured by the reduction in the amount of track mileage owned and operated by the
railroads over the past fifty years, which is illustrated in the table
below: 71
Year
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955

1960

Miles of
Road Owned
240,293
253,789
252,845
249,398
249,052
241,822
233,670
226,696
223,779
220,670
217,552

Mileage Operated
First
Main Track
All Tracks

240,831
257,569
259,941
258,631
260,440
252,930
245,740
239,438
236,857
233,955
230,169

351,767
391,141
406,579
417,954
429,883
419,228
405,975
398,054
396,380
390,965
381,745

As the table suggests, value-of-service pricing encouraged the use
of existing facilities only; and the Commission's adherence to this
68. Id. at 153.
69. See 85 ICC ANN. REP. 72 (1971).
70. In the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211,
Congress created a Coordinator of Transportation to promote rail unification, especially at terminals. In the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 7, 54 Stat. 905, Congress amended section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), to
encourage voluntary rail unifications by permitting the Commission more easily to
authorize them.
71. 44 ICC .ANN. REP., Table I, at 131 (1930); 51 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 127
(1937); 64 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 141 (1950); 75 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 195
(1961). Mileage given is as of Dec. 31 of that year, and mileage operated includes trackage rights. The net total mileage continued to grow until 1930 due to the use of track
agreements; but even this figure has steadily declined since then.
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criterion did not add to the overcapacity, although the continued
adherence to value of service by the railroads may have accelerated
the need to reduce capacity as the motor carriers were given an
opportunity to compete for high-value commodities that were charged
high rates by the railroads. In any event, capacity has declined and
continues to decline without any sharp breaches in available service.
The Study Group Report insists that value-of-service pricing
can exist only in the presence of monopoly power. The Report finds
"monopoly power" in high market share and inherent cost advantages.72 If there were more competition between the railroads
and the other modes, the Report continues, such monopoly power
could not exist, for rates would necessarily be cost-oriented. The
Report writers apparently believe the Commission "allows" only
"contrived and false" intermodal competition that "results in a
discriminatory rate system . . . which misallocates transportation
resources on a massive scale." 73
The errors contained in the Study Group Report's analysis of
the railroad's economic power are threefold. First, the Report
does not attempt to show that over-all railroad profits are excessive. Although revenue-to-cost ratios on some commodities are
much higher than on others, the "monopoly power" of which the
Report speaks is not shown to have resulted in a general level of
rail rates that substantially exceeds average -unit costs. Furthermore,
the Report gives no authority for its pronouncements concerning
what is or is not "allowed" by the Commission. Rates are initially
established by the regulated carriers through the filing and posting
of tariffs. If there were instances in which intrarailroad rate competition was stifled by the Commission, they should not be difficult to
document; but they in fact do not exist.74
The most important of the Report's mistakes is its understatement of the potential and actual effects of motor competition on railroad rates and earnings. A recurrent theme of many Commission
72. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 157•81.
73. Id. at 181.
74. The rate agreements approved by the Commission under section 5a of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970), accord each carrier the right of independent action, which includes even the right to revoke or modify outstanding authorizations granted by carriers to tariff-publishing agents. See Rule 52 of Tariff Circular No. 20, 337 I.C.C. 274, 279-81 (1970).
The STUDY GROUP REPORT apparently relies only on Adams, The Role of Competition in Regulated Industries, 70 .AM. ECON. AssN. PAPERS &: PROCEEDINGS 527, 533-84
(1958) (the Report miscites this article as 48 AM. ECON. REv. 533, see STUDY GROUP
REPORT, supra note 1, at 137 n.ll), a broadside attack on all regulation of interstate
carriers and, in particular, the Commission's handling of one section 5a agreement,
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decisions starting from the early 1940's is that motor transportation
is or is becoming widespread and poses a serious threat to railroad
earnings. This theme is repeated in major rate cases75 and rail-merger
hearings.76
The steady growth of the motor carriers' participation in intercity traffic demonstrates the intense competition encountered by
the railroads. The Commission's annual reports to Congress show
the following distribution of intercity ton-miles between railroads
and motor carriers: 77
Year

Railroads
(including express and mail)
(in billions)

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

631.4
655.9
626.2
558.7
582.5
579.1
567.0
600.0
629.3
666.2

1970

768.0

708.7
750.8

731.2
756.8

774.0

Motor Vehicles
(in billions)
226.2
253.8
244.9
255.5
288.5
297.7
313.l
331.3
331.8
349.8
388.4
380.9
388.5
396.3
404.0
412.0

The railroads' share of the intercity market declined from forty-five
per cent of the total intercity traffic in 1959 to forty per cent in 1969.78
This result in itself would suggest that intramodal competition is
not necessary.
75. E.g., Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 321 I.C.C. 637,
658-59 (1964); Paint & Related Articles in Official Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 440-41 (1959);
New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 488-92, modified 263 I.C.C. 771
(1945).
76. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475, 514-20,
modified 328 I.C.C. 304, affd. sub nom. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 259 F.
Supp. 964 (1966), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United
States, 362 U.S. 372 (1967); Norfolk & W. Ry.-Merger, 307 I.C.C. 401, 416, 440 (1959).
77. 71 ICC .ANN. REP. 11 (1957); 72 ICC ANN. REP. 10 (1958); 73 ICC ANN. REP. 11
(1959); 74 ICC .ANN. REP. 10 (1960); 75 ICC .ANN. REP. 15 (1961); 76 ICC ANN. REP. 12
(1962); 77 ICC .ANN. REP. 74 (1963); 78 ICC .ANN. REP. 34 (1964); 79 ICC ANN. REP. 59
(1965); 80 ICC ANN. REP. 53 (1966); 81 ICC .ANN. REP. 55 (1967); 82 ICC ANN. REP.
86 (1968); 83 ICC .ANN. REP. 87 (1969); 84 ICC .ANN. REP. 77 (1970); 85 ICC ANN. REP.
119 (1971). Data for 1970 are preliminary.
78. 75 ICC .ANN. REP. 15 (1961); 85 ICC .ANN. REP. 119 (1971). Modes included in

the total of domestic intercity traffic are railroads (including express and mail), motor
vehicles, inland waterways (including Great Lakes), oil pipelines, and airways (including
express, mail, and excess baggage).
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However, there is yet another factor indicating the importance
of motor carrier competition when considering railroad profits. Besides the Commission's direct control over each general increase
proposed by the railroads, it possesses the means to regulate railroad
earnings indirectly through the regulation of motor carrier earnings. Therefore, the rate increases allowed the railroads may result in substantially lesser percentage increases than projected, because of motor carrier competition.
The Commission recognized in the 1960's that it was necessary
to consider motor carrier earnings more closely than in prior years.
For this reason, the Commission came to the realization that it had
not developed techniques for deciding how much profit the various
groups of motor carriers should earn, and that it needed to do so to
implement over-all transportation policy.79
Recently, the railroads, too, have begun to monitor motor carrier
earnings more closely. They have responded to such competition
with a new variety of volume rates that are designed to expand
traffic and revenues. We next examine how the value-of-service
standards, which are reflected in these volume rates, confronted the
discrimination sections of the statute, and the work of the Commission in resolving the conflict.
IV.

THE TREND IN

VOLUME RATE

REDUCTIONS

The Commission's contributions in the field of rate-making in
the 1960's extended to many areas, not the least of which concerned
the new varieties of volume rate reductions. Here, again, the questions before the Commission were resolved not strictly in terms of
the cost of service, but instead on other and broader principles.
In the earliest period of federal railroad regulation, the Commission, seeking to protect small shippers, denied the existence of
carload cost savings through its refusal to approve discounts for
carload movements.80 Its attitude changed, however, as new techniques of cost accounting were developed and better accounts were
kept by the railroads. By 1939, the Commission had removed not
only the regulatory restraints on the filing of reduced carload rates,
but also those on the further-reduced multicar and unit-train rates. 81
79. See pts. VI & VIII infra.
80. Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W.R.R., 1 I.C.C. 363 (1887): 1915 Western
Rate Advance Case-Part II, 37 I.C.C. 114, 155 (1915), See III-B I. SHARFMAN, supra
note 13, at 404-06.
81. See Molasses from Nel'I' Orleans, La. to Peoria & Pekin, Ill., 235 I.C.C. 485, 502
(1939).

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1241

Nevertheless, only in the 1960's-when the railroads filed a number
of new volume rate reductions-did these carriers become fully
aware of the increased profits obtainable through the use of greatly
reduced volume rates. 82 The resulting increased number of volume
rate applications that occurred during that period raised for the
Commission several knotty questions concerning discrimination.
In the first of the Eastern Seaboard Coal cases,83 the Commission
was faced with price discrimination among coal shippers. The proposed rate ·reduction of thirty-five cents per ton in this case was
conditioned on the consignee's receiving at least 1.5 million tons of
coal from one or more of the specified points of origin. The impetus
for the reduced rate was the threatened construction by the consignee
electric company of a generating plant at the mouth of the coal
mine. Construction of the plant would have deprived the railroad
of a substantial volume of coal traffic. In light of these facts, the
Commission found that the reduced volume rate was not unjustly
discriminatory.
The second of these cases84 was similar to the first. There the
railroads again faced a potential loss of coal traffic. Shippers were
threatening to substitute less expensive imported residual fuel oil
for coal. The railroads' response was to meet the competition with a
specially tailored reduction of the coal rates. The reduction was conditioned on the shipment of a stated annual volume so tliat the
reduced rate would apply only to the coal that would othenvise be
replaced by oil. The Commission considered the possibility that the
proposed schedules contravened the proscription against unjust discrimination among shippers of like goods found in section 285 of the
Interstate Commerce Act, but decided that
[t]here is no evidence that the proposed rates are designed to
create favoritism among shippers of like traffic, or that they are in
fact creating or are likely to create favoritism. On the contrary, the
only purpose of these rates is to prevent substantial traffic losses to
the respondent railroads. As such, the discrimination resulting from
82. See generally P. MAcAvoY &: J. SLOSS, REGULATION OF TRANSPORT INNOVATION,
THE ICC AND THE UNIT CoAL TRAINS TO THE EAsT CoAST (1967). Unfortunately, the
authors relied upon the railroads' brief in Coal to New York Harbor, 311 I.C.C. 355
(1960), for the proposition that the railroads believed that restraints continued after
1939. Id. at 77, citing Brief for Respondent Railroads at 34. In context, that brief
merely said that the railroads would have to show competition existed at the eastern
seaboard to avoid the requirement of the statute (49 U.S.C. § 4 (1970)) that inland
points receive comparable discounts.
83. Coal from Ky., Va., &: W. Va. to Va., 308 I.C.C. 99 (1959).
84. Coal to New York Harbor Area, 311 I.C.C. 355 (1960).
85. 49 u.s.c. § 2 (1970).
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the reduced rates may be considered as justified by the circumstances
and conditions attending the particular transportation service.80
The Commission also considered the possibility that the proposed
schedule was unduly preferential, a result that would be in contravention of section 387 of the Act. It concluded that the proposed
rates did not violate this provision either, emphasizing that
[t]here is no objection to these rates by any coal shipper or receiver,
nor is there any indication that injury or disadvantage might be sustained by any such shipper or receiver as a result of these rates. The
utilities do not compete with any receivers of bituminous coal at the
destinations specified in the tariffs. Without a showing of competition or disadvantage, there can be no finding of undue preference or
prejudice.as
Thus, after a consideration of the particular circumstances-but
with no discussion of cost savings-the Commission concluded that
the proposed schedule was lawful.
~
In the years that followed the Eastern Seaboard Coal cases, the
Commission continued to approve volume rate tariffs without finding violations of section 2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
For example, multiple-car rates on grain were permitted to become
effective in 1963, although final approval was not given until 1965.80
And annual-volume rates on coal between two points in Indiana
were approved in 1964 despite objections raised by a supplier of
natural gas.90 In 1965, certain carload rates on champagne, vermouth,
and wine were allowed by the Commission so that railroads could
effectively compete with unregulated water transportation. The rates
in this latter case were also approved without reference to cost
savings in a report of the entire Commission.91
Several other annual-volume rates were permitted to take effect
during this period without the institution of formal investigations.
These included rates on coal,92 soybean meal or cake for export,03
86. 311 I.C.C. at 369.
87. 49 u.s.c. § 3 (1970).
88. 311 I.C.C. at 367.
89. Grain in Multiple-Car Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 325 I.C.C. 752
(1965), following Temand in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. &: Tex. Pac,, Ry., 379
U.S. 642 (1965).
90. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. New York Cent. R.R., 323 I.C.C. 75
(1964).

91. Wine, Pac. Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167 (1966), afjg. 326 I.C.C. 119 (1965).
92. Suspension :Bd. Case No. 44247 (I.C.C., Nov. 16, 1966); Suspension :Bd. Case No.
45347 (I.C.C., May 8, 1967).
93. Investigation & Suspension Docket No. 8353 (I.C.C., May 5, 1967),
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corn and soybeans,94 and raw cane sugar.95 However, it is the Renta-Train case96 that provides the best illustration of the trend of the
Commission's policies regarding volume rate discounts. The novel
tariff in this case involved a 700,000-dollars-per-year rate on shipments of oats, wheat, or corn, when the transportation was performed
in shipper-furnished cars. To be eligible for this rate, shippers were
required to tender shipments for a minimum number of trips each
year, and for each trip the shipper was limited to 8,600 tons per
86-car train; if additional cars were needed, the tariff was correspondingly higher. In the Commission's eyes, this rate structure was
analogous to multicar and unit-train rates, and it therefore rendered
a favorable opinion on this plan, too.
Many of these and other similar rate cases involved exclusive
dealing provisions, which at least one commentator would limit.97
But as the Commission explained in Rent-a-Train, the exclusive
dealing provisions would constitute destructive competitive practices
only when the railroads were at the same time attempting to meet
the competition of other modes of transportation subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act. If the competition occurred benveen coal
and residual oil, or involved other "market competition," an exclusive dealing arrangement would not be unlawful per se.98
Despite the Commission's favorable attitude toward exclusive
dealing arrangements for quantity rate shipping, an annual-volume
rate, predicated upon a similar arrangement, would not be permissible in most cases. Such an arrangement could bind the shipper's
traffic to one carrier, or a group of carriers, to the exclusion of other
carriers, for an excessive period of time. 99 The shipper, in the Com94. Suspension Bd. Case No. 43803 (I.C.C., Sept. 9, 1966, affd. Sept. 13, 1966).
95. Suspension Bd. Case No. 41917 (I.C.C., Dec. 16, 1965, affd. Dec. 20, 1965).
96. Grain by Rent-a-Train, IFA Territory to Gulf Ports, 335 I.C.C. 111 (1969),
a[fd., 339 I.C.C. 579 (1971).
97. Note, Exclusive Dealing Provisions Under the Interstate Commerce Act: A Reappraisal, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1536 (1969).
98. 339 I.C.C. at 590-91.
99. It has been suggested that an exclusive dealing arrangement be allowed, (1)

where the railroad would have to invest a considerable sum of money to inaugurate a
new service, or (2) where the carrier competition was seasonal. Note, supra note 97, at
1547. Both examples might violate the Interstate Commerce Act in the presence of
cai;rier competition, but not market competition.
Those who urge this view unduly minimize the "lock-in" effect of an exclusive deal•
ing arrangement, arguing that the lock-in would last no more than one year, since
"upon e.-xpiration of the tariff, the shipper's traffic would be open to bidding by all
competing carriers." They also suggest that the shipper could withdraw from the agreement at least during the early part of the tariff period. Id. at 1544. The latter suggestion would not likely be feasible if a shipper had geared its operation for large-volume
shipments by rail. The tariffs in question, of course, do not "expire" at the end of one
year; and a "lock-in" effect of a full year could in fact do substantial harm to a competing carrier.
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mission's view, should not be placed in a position that would make
the acceptance of superior or equal transportation services from
another regulated carrier prohibitively expensive. If the minimum
tonnage required by the exclusive dealing condition were set so high
that it removed a substantial portion of the traffic from the competitive arena, tying the traffic to one carrier, other carriers would
be precluded merely by the form of the tariff from competing. Such
a result would violate the National Transportation Policy.100
On the other hand, annual-volume rates have been approved, or
permitted to take effect without suspension101 of the effective date,
whenever the reduced rates merely permitted a shipper to meet the
competition of another shipper or group of shippers, or produced
an indirect effect on shippers. In one case, for example, the reductions were filed on raw materials moving to a processing facility; the
only carrier competition brought to the attention of the Commission
here was that in the marketing of the finished product.102 In three
other cases, the reduced annual-volume rates affected the market
competition at the distribution points after the movements from the
points of production occurred.103 None of these rates involved carrier
competition; therefore, none were suspended.
A basic question relating to volume rates that affect market competition remains unexplored on any formal record before the Commission. Should the Commission establish limits on the rate advantages accorded large shippers or ports, and, if so, what should those
limits be?104 On the one hand, there is Justice Holmes' admonition
that the "law does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities, or
abilities" ;105 on the other, there might be a point beyond which a
large shipper or an individual port would be "unduly preferred"
100. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970). See New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 368
U.S. 349 (1962), afjg. mem. 194 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afjg. Contract Rates on Rugs
and Carpeting from Amsterdam, N.Y. to Chicago, 313 I.C.C 247 (1961).
101. The Commission can suspend the operation of proposed rates for up to seven
months. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970). For the history of the power, see Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 662-66 (1962). For a recent critical analysis of the e.xercise of
the power, see Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examinatio11
of Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 39 (1971).
102. Suspension Bd. Case No. 41917 (I.C.C., Dec. 16, 1965, afjd,, I.C.C. Div. 2, Dec, 20,
1965).
103. Suspension Bd. Case No. 45287 (I.C.C., April 26, 1967, afjd., I.C.C. Div. 2, April
27, 1967); Suspension Bd. Case No. 45060 (I.C.C., March 29, 1967, afjd., I.C.C. Div, 2,
March 31, 1967); Suspension Bd. Case No. 41869 (I.C.C., Dec. 1, 1965).
104. The Secretary of Agriculture briefly raised the issue in Soybean Cake or Meal
for Export, Redfield, Iowa to Port Arthur, Tex., Investigation &: Suspension Docket
No. 8353 (I.C.C.), but the order of suspension was vacated without investigation on
May 5, 1967.
105. ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42, 46 (1911).
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and a smaller competitor "unduly prejudiced" by rate advantages
accorded the larger entity merely for reasons of size. The only available legal standard helpful in answering this question lies in a broad
statement of the Supreme Court made many years ago:
To bring a difference in rates within the prohibition of Sec. 3 [of
the Interstate Commerce Act], it must be shown that the discrimination practiced is unjust when measured by the transportation standard. In other words, the difference in rates cannot be held illegal,
unless it is shown that it is not justified by the cost of the respective
service, by their values, or by other transportation conditions.106

The above issue has become more important with the appearance of
the numerous volume discounts of the 1960's, and it is not likely to
disappear without substantial litigation.107
V.

THE

EXPANSION OF COMPETITION AMONG THE PORTS

The complex rate-making tasks performed by the Commission
in the 1960's were not confined to the increasing role of volume
discounts. One of its major undertakings was the enforcement of
fair competition among the nation's ports, a task that concerned
perhaps more conflicting interests than any other the Commission
faced. The crux of this problem lies in the fact that the provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act that protect shippers and localities
from the discrimination are not cost-oriented. When, for example,
Congress amended the statute in 1935 to protect ports, it did not
thereby seek to further the most efficient development of economic
resources, except insofar as it might be consistent with its purpose
to "encourage and promote the freedom of movement ... through
the ports of the country," so that commerce could "move freely
through as many available ports as the governing circumstances will
reasonably permit."108 For this reason, the Commission has given
controlling weight to considerations other than distance, which presumably measures certain costs, in requiring the railroads to equalize
their rates between competing ports. 109 The Commission's position
received new emphasis in several cases during the 1960's.
106. United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924).
107. The problem is particularly acute in cases involving a reduced rate that is conditioned upon a minimum past movement. Whenever annual-volume rates are conditioned upon minimum volumes shipped in a prior period, the annual-volume reduction
may be more a reward for past patronage than an incentive to ship larger volumes. It is
also unavailable to shippers first entering the field, and therefore might stifle shipper
competition altogether.
108. H.R. REP. No. 1512, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
109. In the late 1940's and the 1950's the common practice was to give diminishing
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Texas Gulf Port Cases

In a series of cases involving the Texas Gulf ports, the Commission at first did not have to look beyond the distance principle to
promote port competition. Upon finding that the distance between
Freeport and the territory in question was comparable to that between the "Houston group" 110 and the same territory,111 the Commission required equality of treatment for Freeport and the Houston
group on export and other traffic to and from points exceeding 150
miles from the Houston group.112 But distance alone would not
fulfill the congressional mandate to promote traffic through all of the
ports. Accordingly, the Commission also required that Corpus
Christi, a port not as well situated as either Freeport or the Houston
group, be equalized with the Houston group for grain traffic flowing
from the same territory,113 and for cotton moving from an even wider
territory of origin.114 In the latter case, the distances to Corpus
Christi were from twenty per cent to si..xty per cent greater than to
the Houston group under the mileage standard on which the Commission most heavily relied.115 Despite this fact, a three-judge district
court on appeal sustained the Commission's decision in the case
involving cotton on the grounds that "there is more to natural
advantage and location than geographic mileage differences, and
shorter mileage to one port does not automatically give immunity
from rate equalization."116 The district court gave its approval to
the Commission's rejection of a "mechanical definition of a prejudice"117 and held that the Commission's equalization order was
rationally based in light of the similarity of the terrain throughout
weight to distance and increasing weight to competition only as the length of the haul
increased. See Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1949). See
also Baltimore 8: O.R.R. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 258, 275 (D. Md.), modified per
curiam sub nom. ICC v. Baltimore 8: O.R.R., 355 U.S. 175 (1957).
110. The Houston group includes the cities of Houston, Galveston, and Texas City.
111. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist. v. Abilene 8: S. Ry., 319 I.C.C. 54, 67
(1963), afjd. 322 I.C.C. 529 (1964), afjd. sub nom. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry. v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
112. 322 I.C.C. at 68.
113. Export Grain from Tex. to Tex. Points, 319 I.C.C. 16 (1963). Nueces County
Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry., 315 I.C.C. 155 (1961).
114. Nueces County Navigation Dist. No. I v. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry., 325 I.C.C,
400 (1965), afjd. sub nom. City of Galveston v. United States, 257 F. Supp, 243 (S.D, Tc.x,
1966), afjd. mem., 386 U.S. 269 (1967).
115. 325 I.C.C. at 408. The distance was much less under other mileage standards
to which the Commission referred,
116. City of Galveston v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 243, 248 (S.D, Tc.x. 1966), affd,
mem., 386 U.S. 269 (1967),
117. 257 F. Supp. at 247.

Transport Rate Regulation

June 1972]

1247

southwestern Texas and the prior equalization of rates charged for
other commodities flowing from these same origins to both Corpus
Christi and the Houston group.

B. South Atlantic Port Cases
The problem of rate equalization also arose before the Commission in cases concerning the country's southeastern ports. By
1961, the Gulf ports were already on a parity with the South Atlantic
ports for all export and import traffic to and from "Central Territory"-an area covering Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan's Lower
Peninsula, and adjacent Mississippi and Great Lakes ports in certain
bordering states. It was the Commission's opinion that similar parity
should be granted to Tampa, Florida; consequently, it ordered parity
for Tampa on traffic moving from those points of origin within the
Territory, whose distances from Tampa fell within the range of
distances from the same points to the Gulf and South Atlantic ports
when the rates to those ports were equal.118 Furthermore, the Commission ordered parity from those same points between Tampa and
the South Atlantic ports whenever the rates to the South Atlantic
ports exceeded the rates to the Gulf ports.119 The relief thus granted
Tampa entrance into competition with the range of ports extending from Wilmington, North Carolina and Morehead City, North
Carolina to the Houston group and Corpus Christi on the Gulf.
In another Atlantic port proceeding, the question of prejudice
bet\V'een ports was again raised. Goods moving to Morehead Cityas opposed to Wilmington-were charged higher freight rates when
the point of origin was within the "Interior Southern Territory"a region including points west of Danville, Virginia, to the Mississippi River.120 The railroads had equalized the rates to these ports
for goods shipped from origins that were more distant. The Commission concluded from this fact that there was no justification for
the Interior Southern Territory price differential. It explained:
[W]e are satisfied that cost alone provides an inadequate basis upon
which to determine the issues here before us. Moreover, it is clear
. . . that such a basis might defeat its own purpose by encouraging
the carriers to reduce their import and export rates . . . to the pre118. Hillsborough County Port Auth. v. Ahnapee & W. Ry., 313 I.C.C. 691, 705-06
(1961), affd. sub nom. Alabama, T. & N.R.R. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.
Ala. 1962).
119. 313 I.C.C. at 706.
120. City of Wilmington v. Alabama Great S.R.R., 316 I.C.C. 709 (1962).
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scribed minimum level, thus resulting in needless dissipation of carrier revenues.
The general policy of the Commission in cases of this kind has
been to permit or require equalization where the geographically
handicapped port appeared to be at a serious competitive disadvantage by reason of the rate adjustment, provided that such equalization was confined ·within reasonable limits determined by the needs
of the ports concerned, the carriers serving them, and the shipping
public. Generally, such equalization has not been approved in areas
close to the respective ports.121
For this reason, the Commission approved equalization of the exportimport rates from the Interior Southern Territory to the two ports,
except when the class-rate122 distances between such points and
Morehead City exceeded those to Wilmington by more than twentyfive per cent. In these instances, the use of differentially higher rates
to Morehead City was approved.123

C. North Atlantic Port Cases
The Commission's effort to give credence to distance, and hence
to cost of service, in the competition between the North Atlantic
ports met only with court reversal during the 1960's.
From the period prior to federal regulation of the railroads,
traffic moving through the southern-tier ports-Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Hampton Roads-had enjoyed export and import rates
lower than those charged to the northern-tier ports, in New York and
New England, from "Differential Territory"-an area west of
the Buffalo-Pittsburgh line to the Mississippi River and north of
the Ohio River. When the railroads serving the northern tier attempted to place that group of ports on a parity with the southern
tier for rates to and from Differential Territory, the Commission refused to lend its approval to the newly reduced rates.124 Its
decision was reversed on appeal.125 The district court held that the
proximity of the southern-tier ports, especially Baltimore, to
121. 316 I.C.C. at 723, 725.
122. See note 52 supra.
123. 316 I.C.C. at 725-26.
124. Equalization of Rates at North Atlantic Ports, 311 I.C.C, 689 (1969), affd,, 814
I.C.C. 185 (1961). At the same time the railroads serving the northern tier reduced thek
rates, those serving the southern tier reduced theirs to preserve the differential, and
both sets of changes in the rates were suspended, investigated, and subsequently dis•
approved by the Commission.
125. Boston and M.R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830 {D, Mass. 1962), affd. by
an equally divided court sub nom. Baltimore 8: O.R.R. v. Boston 8: M.R.R., 37ll U.S.
372 (1963).

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1249

Differential Territory could not justify the Commission's action. It
reasoned that the Commission's decision, "if pressed to its logical
conclusion, would result in traffic flowing only through the most
distance favored port."126
The differential rates on imported iron ore were also the subject
of numerous Commission and court opinions in the 1950's and 1960's.
During this period, the Commission found the reduced rates on iron
ore from New York to Differential Territory unlawful, but ap•
proved the reduced rates from Philadelphia.127 Both aspects of its
holding were reversed in nvo separate appeals.128 On remand, the
Commission approved the New York reduction, yet reaffirmed its
approval of the Philadelphia reduction.129 In reversing its previous
position regarding New York, the Commission noted that carrier
costs to and from New York were higher because of "the longer rail
hauls involved from the port of .New York," but held that "relative
distances involved in railroad service to and from competing ports
is only one factor to be considered in the equalization of rail rates to
and from competing ports on export and import traffic ...." 130
These decisions of the 1960's effectively establish the principle
that export and import rates strictly tailored to transportation costs
are not permissible under existing law if they unduly restrict port
competition. The factor of distance, and hence costs, is but one of
several factors to be considered, as both the Commission and the
courts indicated. Thus, the Commission was not alone in recognizing
and enforcing these noncost considerations in the establishment of
freight rates, an effort that must in the future expand further the
competition among the nation's ports.

VI.

MAXIMUM

RATE

REGULATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIBRS

By the mid-1940's, the decline of railroad intercity traffic and the
growth of interstate motor truck traffic had become an annual event.
126. 202 F. Supp. at 837. The court added that the sole function of the differential
had been to offset the higher ocean rates to Philadelphia, a situation that no longer
pertained. The Commission thereafter accepted the filing of reduced rates between
New York and Differential Territory on export and import traffic, except for those
on coal, coke, and iron ore. See Iron Ore from E. Ports to Cent. Freight Assn. Points,
321 I.C.C. 473, 489 (1964).
127. Iron Ore from E. Ports to Cent. Freight Assn. Points, 314 I.C.C. 149 (1961).
128. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1962); New York
Cent. R.R. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
129. Iron Ore from E. Points to Cent. Freight Assn. Points, 321 I.C.C. 473' (1964).
By this time the iron ore traffic had been diverted from the North Atlantic ports to the
St. Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes ports. 321 I.C.C. at 475.
130. 321 I.C.C. at 489.
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For hauls up to 200 or 300 miles, the available evidence demonstrated
that the motor carriers clearly held a cost advantage.181 The Commission's response to this development was to promote an orderly
change so that the motor carriers could benefit from their "inherent
advantage" while railroads adjusted to the decreased demand for
their services.
The Commission therefore permitted general increases in motor
carrier rates to assist the railroads to maintain their own increases
without losing traffic. The Commission believed that in this manner
both modes would fairly compete and yet maintain needed levels of
service. The Commission in explaining its position noted:
Whether the railroads ,vill be able to maintain the increases here
sought ,vill depend largely upon whether their principal competitors,
the motor carriers, make similar increases in their freight rates and
charges. The motor carriers are not parties to this proceeding, but
obviously their entire rate structure and freight revenues will be indirectly affected by the decision in this case. . . .
Railroad executives who testified that total freight revenues
would be increased rather than reduced by the proposed increases
based their opinion, in part, upon the fact that, in the past, motorcarrier rates have been quickly increased after a general freight rate
increase by the railroads. In most cases if the motor carriers do not
increase their rates, the railroads ,vill not be able to maintain the
increases. This fact is of particular significance when it is realized
that the total revenues of the motor carriers subject to our jurisdiction are now more than half as much as those of the railroads subject
to our jurisdiction.1s2

Or, as the Commission many years later said, the general increases
allowed the motor carriers during the I940's and 1950's "in certain
ways supported the increases required by the railroads to maintain
their service."183
In 1962, the railroads' total intercity ton-miles, but not their
relative participation in total intercity traffic, began increasing over
the previous year. This trend continued throughout the 1960's, as
the total intercity ton-miles of all modes increased.184 The new eco131. See, e.g., New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 583 (1945),
132. Increased Freight Rates, E., W. & S. Territories, 1956, 300 I.C.C. 633, 667-68
(1957). See also Increases, Transcontinental-Intermountain Coast, 304 I.C.C. 15, 16-17
(1958); Transcontinental & Western Increases, 1952, 61 M.C.C. 755, 756 (1953); Trans•
continental & Rocky Mountain Increases, 54 M.C.C. 377, 378 (1952); Transcontinental
Motor Rates-Increases, 49 M.C.C. 211, 213 (1949).
133. Increased Class & Commodity Rates, Transcontinental, 329 I.C.C. 420, 422
(1967).
134. See table accompanying note 77 supra.

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1251

nomic activity in the nation during the early 196O's, which was
responsible for this increase in rail traffic, also produced higher
profits for the motor carrier industry.135 Together, these events made
the Commission more conscious of the importance of accurately
measuring, and controlling, motor carrier earnings. As a result, the
Commission set new standards for testing whether the proposed rate
increases would indeed be "just and.reasonable." In short, the "operating ratio"-formerly the Commission's fundamental tool in evaluating motor carrier performance-was no longer deemed sufficient.
The operating ratio lent itself nicely to the broad-brush regulatory policy followed by the Commission in the years preceding
1960. This ratio of expenses to revenues had originated with the
railroads as a test of their year-to-year efficiency and stability of
income.130 A high operating ratio in one year might indicate instability, for the small profit margin could easily evaporate into a
loss.1a1
However, the operating ratio took on a different meaning in the
regulation of the level of motor carrier rates. Without relating the
ratio to any return on investment, the Commission adopted a ninetythree per cent operating ratio as the test of a £air and reasonable
profit level for the regulated motor carriers.138 In many of this
period's rate hearings, the Commission stated that mass comparisons
of costs and rates of hundreds of carriers could thereby be made
more easily.139
Certain state commissions also began to rely on the operating
ratio as a test of fair earnings for local carriers, such as bus companies;140 but most of these commissions did not stray very far from
the rate-of-return-on-investment standard, which they used to check
the results reached under an operating ratio.141 Nonetheless, it was
135. See 79 ICC ANN. REP. Table J5, at 162 (1965).
186. E. SALIERS, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 838 (1923).
137. Studies were also done to determine to what extent this ratio reflected variations in volume of traffic, and hence reflected elements of constant costs. R. WESr•
MEYER, ECONOJIUCS OF TRANSPORTATION 75-77 (1952).
138. See, e.g., Increased Common Carrier Truck Rates in the East, 42 M.C.C. 633,
650 (1943).
139. Central Territory General Increases, 49 M.C.C. 4, 12 (1948); New England,
1946 Increased Rates, 47 M.C.C. 509, 518 (1947). In Middle West General Increases, 48
M.C.C. 541, 550 (1948), the Commission added that the ratio is useful in deciding upon
appropriate differentials as between truckload and less-than-truckload rates.
140. E.g., Metropolitan Coach Lines, 10 P.U.R.3d 337, 844 (Cal. Pub. Util. Commn.
1955); Savannah Transit Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 880 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1955); Pittsburgh
Rys., 21 P.U.R.3d 170 (Pa. Pub. Util. Commn. 1957).
141. See, e.g., cases cited in note 140 supra; Long Beach Motor Bus Co., 12 P.U.R.3d
198, 204 (Cal. Pub. Util. Commn. 1955); Duke Power Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 300 (N.C. Util.
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the complete departure from rate-of-return concepts by one local
commission that led to the famous opinion by the United States
Court of Appeals £or the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en
bane, on the subject of operating ratios. The decision not only affected the local regulatory agencies, but influenced the Commission's
regulatory policies as well.
In D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Commission (Third Bebchick),142 the court reviewed the
propriety of the operating ratio as a test of fair earnings, and concluded that the use of this standard alone would not suffice. The
court was aware of the £act that the Interstate Commerce Commission
believed this standard "provide[d] a £airer test of revenue needs in
in an industry in which, characteristically, a carrier's capital investment is small in comparison to his total costs."143 It noted:
The principal risk in such operations inheres in the cost of operation,
not in the investment. Accordingly, the operating ratio method permits a carrier to earn an amount representing annual operating costs,
plus an additional amount from which to pay interest to the creditors
and dividends to the owners.1 44
However, the court also observed that it had not been shown, either
before the Interstate Commerce Commission or before any other
tribunal, how the fair amount allowable £or interest and dividends
could be measured from a review of bare operating ratios. When
annual operating costs greatly exceed investment, for example, a
return of 6.5 per cent on revenues would allow the regulated company a considerably greater dollar profit than a 6.5 per cent return
on investment. The court recognized that it was, perhaps, the "apparent ex~essiveness of adequate returns expressed in traditional
return-on-rate base terms" that led to the adoption of the operating
ratio; 145 but the court held the local commission must return to the
fundamental rate-making standard established by the Supreme Court
Commn. 1956); Salt Lake City Lines, 2 P.U.R.3d 405 (Utah Pub. Serv. Commn. 1953);
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. 8: Transp. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 82, 94 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Commn.
1951).
142. 350 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The case of 13ebchick. v. Public Util. Commn.,
287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961), involved questions of standing. The case of 13ebchick v.
Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963), involved not only the merits of transit fares in the District of Columbia, but also the
question of restitution of increases not shown to be reasonable, a matter discussed at
text accompanying notes 213-14 infra. The fourth case of this group is entitled Williams v,
Washington Metro. Area Transit Commn., 415 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir, 1968).
143. 350 F.2d at 759.
144, 350 F.2d at 759-60.
145. 350 F.2d at 760 n.9.
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in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.: 146 that a just and reasonable rate
may be fixed only with "particularized reference" to the needs of the
regulated company in servicing its debt and equity and in meeting
its legitimate expenses.147
In other words, Third Bebchick concluded that alth_ough it
might not be possible or desirable to determine these needs in terms
of a percentage of investment, a detailed inquiry into the needs of
the company for earnings above operating expenses must nevertheless be made. In the court's view, an operating ratio, such as 95.13
per cent, suggests "only that the legitimate operating expenses found
by the Commission ... account for all but 4.87 per cent of the total
revenues expected to be realized from the approved fare structure."148
The gross revenues allowed are to cover expenses and "something
more"; that is, the "sum of money needed to attract the capital, both
debt and equity, required to insure financial stability and the resulting capacity of the utility to render the service upon which the public
depends."140
The Interstate Commerce Commission had expressed dissatisfaction with the operating ratio several years prior to 1965;150 but after
Third Bebchick was decided, it began disapproving general rate
increases on the basis of that decision.151 In addition, it moved
146. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
147. 350 F.2d at 778.
148. 350 F.2d at 778-79.
149. 350 F.2d at 779. The court added:
To determine that sum entails inquiries and findings-judgmental as the latter
may often be because ratemakers must be prophets of the future as well as historians of the past-into such things as the capital programs in prospect, what such
programs entail in terms of down-payments as well as financing, the cost of borrowing money, working capital needs, the desirable ratio of debt to equity, the
incentives required by a stockholder to keep his money in the business and the
dividends and growth: rates requisite to supply these incentives, the opportuuities
in these respects provided in comparable businesses, and the related matters which
must be prayerfully explored by the conscientious regulator before he can begin to
say why he fixed upon 4.87 rather than 6.5 or 3.2.
350 F.2d at 779.
150. General Increases-Transcontinental, 319 I.C.C. 792, 803 (1963): "In view of
the recurring attacks on the use of operating ratios to justify revenue needs • • • the
carriers are admonished that in the future, expense items of representative carriers
should be shown in greater detail, and all pertinent information regarding carrieraffiliate relationships should be disclosed."; General Increase-Middle Atl. & New England Territories, 319 I.C.C. 168, 176 (1963): "The mere showing of present operating
ratios of above 93 percent without a showing of the factors that make up such a ratio
is not sufficient for our purposes.''; General Increases-E. Cent. Territory, 316 I.C.C.
467, 481 (1962): "Although an operating ratio of 93 percent has been found reasonable
in the past, we do not regard such an operating ratio as an immutable standard."
151. Increased Class & Commodity Rates, Transcontinental, 329 I.C.C. 420, 426
(1967), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1963); General Increase, Between East & Territories West,
329 I.C.C. 626, 643 (1965).
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rapidly to require more detailed financial information from motor
carriers.
Previously, the Commission had required the submission of
detailed cost and traffic studies solely on a case-by-case basis. But in
1967, the Commission adopted a new policy governing the quantum
of evidence it expected from motor carriers seeking general rate
increases.152 Now the Commission required such studies to be submitted in a uniform manner, as described in the Commission's
policy statement; and for the first time it explicitly required carriers
to state in detail the "amount of money needed by the carriers over
and above their operating expenses to attract capital."rna
The carriers did not heed the requirements of the Commission's
policy statement and the orders that incorporated its requirements.
This inaction elicited, first, a strongly worded opinion of the entire
Commission in February 1969, and, second, the initiation of a rulemaking proceeding to codify and expand the reporting requirement
for motor carrier earnings.
In the Middle Atlantic and New England proceeding,164 the
motor carriers, as the Commission stated, "made no attempt to
respond to the 1967 Statement of Policy or the usual order for proofs
with respect to the amount of money, in addition to operating expenses, needed to attract debt and equity capital ...." 106 The Commission had already disapproved of the increase on other grounds.100
Thus there was no necessity to discuss further the carrier's failure
to report fully; nevertheless, it proceeded to warn the motor carriers
that it must be provided with such data before it would approve their
general rate increases.
The Commission conceded in Middle Atlantic that a ratio of
operating expenses to operating revenues might indicate the efficiency of management in controlling expenses as well as the relative
profitability of different categories of traffic. However, in terms that
left no doubt about its agreement with Third Bebchick, the Commission proclaimed "[n]o particular operating ratio can be used as the
starting point to prove the existence of or to measure revenue
needs."157 The Commission emphasized that "[s]ome analysis of
the capital costs of the carriers' business must be presented to establish
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

32 Fed. Reg. 7002 (196'7).
32 Fed. Reg. at 7003.
General Increase, Middle Atl. 8: New England, 332 I.C.C, 820 (1969),
332 I.C.C. at 831.
332 I.C.C. at 836.
332 I.C.C. at 820.
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a need for additional revenue, and to measure such need."158 Once
that is done, the earnings element can be translated into an operating
ratio or profit margin. The resulting revenue need can then be
compared to the rate level; and profit margins on various shipments
of less than 1,000 pounds, as distinguished, for example, from truckload shipments, can be assessed to develop the amount of the increase and where it should be allocated. In the Commission's words,
"[the] correct approach assures coverage of [the motor carriers']
capital costs to which they are entitled."159
In 1970 the Commission responded to the motor carriers' failure
to disclose needed information directly. It commenced a rule-making proceeding160 that led to the adoption of the current rules for
submission by motor carriers of data whenever general increases are
filed. Among the new requirements was a prescribed data sheet that
solicited information about the projected earnings on the traffic in
issue.161 The carriers are now specifically required to submit "evidence of the sum of money, in addition to operating expenses, including that needed to attract debt and equity capital, which they ,require
to insure financial stability and the capacity to render service."162
In short, the past decade has marked a complete change in the
Commission's regulation of motor carriers' earnings. But, while it
is clear that the Commission will predicate its decisions upon this
new access to earnings information, the standards the Commission
will employ in sifting through this data and using it to determine a
carrier's need for capital remain unresolved.
Numerous increases were disapproved by the Commission in
the 1960's on the ground that the carriers had not presented representative cost and traffic data.168 As a result, the Commission had few
158. 332 I.C.C. at 837-38.
159. 332 I.C.C. at 838.
160. Proposed New Procedures in Motor Carrier Revenue Proceedings, 339 I.C.C. 324,
340 I.C.C. 1 (1971). Petitions for reconsideration may yet be filed in this proceeding.
161. 36 Fed. Reg. 18309 (1971) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1104.1 to 1104.8 (1972)). For
a base calendar year or for an accounting year the system's total revenue needs are
gained by adding operating expenses and
1, Leasing costs
2. Miscellaneous deductions less other income
3. Income taxes on ordinary income
4. Net income (returns on debt and equity capital)
Only that portion of items 2, 3, and 4 related to transportation is included in the
computation; the allocation between transportation and nontransportation business of
the carriers is made on the basis of the percentage of net tangible property devoted to
transportation activities.
162. 49 C.F.R. § 1104.4 (1972).
163. E.g., Increased LTL Class & Commodity Rates, Pac. Northwest, 329 I.C.C, 1
(1966); Increased Rates Within Southwest & Between Colo. and Wyo. & Southwest, 326
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occasions to reach questions relating to the level of motor carrier
earnings. However, in the cases that have decided the issue, a trend
can clearly be discerned. In one proceeding, the Commission approved a requested rate increase in part on the basis of an earned
rate of return that was lower than the national average.164 In another,
the Middlewest case,166 the Commission refused to approve a general
increase that would have provided a return of more than twenty-five
per cent on the motor carriers' rate base. The Commission found
that these carriers had typically earned approximately fifteen per
cent on equity and that no "convincing showing" was made "of a
need for higher rates."166
Although the evidence is admittedly sketchy, it seems evident
from these cases that the Commission will proceed on a course leading to refined standards for motor carrier profitability. The precise
form for the presentation of past and projected earnings by carriers
seeking rate increases is now prescribed; therefore, in future cases
the Commission and the parties will be able to make use of this data
and, together with expert testimony, derive the proper levels of
motor carrier earnings in accordance with the new standards for
maximum motor carrier rates.
The new standards for motor carrier profitability will have an
effect as well on the regulation of railroad rates. The railroads will
not be able to assume, as they did in the 1940's, that a motor carrier
increase will assist, as a matter of course, their own efforts to distribute a general increase to individual commodities. The railroads will
now have to work harder to explain rate increases on individual
commodities.
VII.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE R.EsTITUTION OF
UNJUSTIFIED RATE INCREASES

In the 1960's the Commission often permitted the proposed annual rate increases of the motor carrier industry to take effect pend1.c.c. 216 (1966); LTL COR Rates-Between East 8: Territories West, 326 I.C.C, 1'14
(1966); LTL Class Rates &: Minimum Charges Between Midwest &: Cent. Territories,
325 I.C.C. 106 (1965).
164. Increased LTL, AQ &: TL Rates, To, From&: Between Ne-111 Eng. Territory, 335
I.C.C. 185, 190, 200 (1969).
165. Increased Rates &: Charges, From, To &: Between Middlewest Territory, 38!,
1.C.C. 142 (1969), affd. sub nom. Admiral-Merchants Motor Freight, Inc, v. United
States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo.), affd. mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
This case resulted in a refund of the increase to shippers, because the Commission

required that the carriers agree to refund the increase, if it were found unjustified, as
a condition to granting the carriers an extension of time to prepare their evidence,
335 I.C.C. at 151.
166. 335 I.C.C. at 150.

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1257

ing an investigation of their lawfulness. After performing these
investigations, which sometimes took up to two years to complete, the
Commission found many of these increases unjustified and, as a consequence, ordered that rates be reduced. The Study Group Report
found in this procedure a "simple but ludicrous"167 pattern of permitting motor carriers to retain rate increases that were ultimately
found to be completely unjustified. For this and other reasons,168
the Report was highly critical of the Commission's regulation of
motor rates.
To be sure, the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission
the choice of suspending or not suspending the effectiveness of proposed increases pending their investigation.169 But if the Commission
had suspended the effectiveness of each rate increase and each of
those increases in fact had been justified, then the motor carriers
would have lost forever the needed amounts that they were unable to
collect during the suspension period. The shippers and consumers,
on the other hand, would have been no worse off if they could have
obtained refunds, with interest, of the unjustified increases.
The problem, therefore, appears to lie in the fact that the Commission does not, for the most part, order the motor carrier industry
to refund rate increases that it finds are unjustified.170 Part !111 of the
Interstate Commerce Act confers authority on the Commission to
order railroads "to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose
behalf such amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates
or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified";172 but Part
Il173 of the Act, which is applicable to motor carriers, contains no
comparable provision. Thus, if the Commission decides that a general increase for a group174 of motor carriers is not justified, it will
hold that the rates have not been shown to be just and reasonable,
and, accordingly, that the carriers have not borne their statutory
167. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
168. For example, the Report was highly critical of ICC regulation of trucking and
intermodal competition. Id. at 170.
169. 49 U.S.C. §§ 15(7), 316(g), 907(g), 1006(e) (1970). For a recent study of the suspension practices of the Commission and other federal agencies, see Spritzer, supra note
101.
170. The exceptional Middlewest refund order is discussed in note 165 supra.
171. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-5, 5b-27 (1970).
172. 49 u.s.c. § 15(7) (1970).
173. 49 u.s.c. §§ 301-27 (1970).
174. The general increases of the motor carrier industry were filed during the 1960's
with the Commission principally by ten rate bureaus. The major rate bureaus each
have 200 or more member carriers in the parent trade association. See generally New
Procedures in Motor Carrier Revenue Proceedings, 339 I.C.C. 324, 326•47 (1971).
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burden of proof.175 Its order, however, will not require a refund of
the excessive charges; instead, the Commission's decision will be accompanied, at most, by an order requiring the carriers to cancel the
offending increase. And if other increases have intervened, even a
cancellation is out of the question, for the rates in issue will have
been superseded.176
Apparently the Study Group Report inferred from the Interstate
Commerce Act's dichotomy between railroads and motor carriers,
and from the Commission's refusal to order refunds, that "under
the statute there is no recovery for shippers who pay the increased
rates if the Commission cancels the increase (for motor carriers)," 177
and therefore concluded, "unless the I.C.C. specifically so provides,
the shippers who have been paying the higher rates ... will simply
have to swallow their past loss ... .''178 Certain developments in the
law of restitution in the 1960's suggest that this conclusion is in error;
the shippers may have a cause of action in common-law restitution.
The theory that can support a cause of action by shippers against
a motor carrier is that under prevailing principles of equity, the carriers will be unjustly enriched if they are permitted to retain moneys
to which they have not shown entitlement. This rationale seems
particularly forceful since the Interstate Commerce Act imposes an
affirmative duty on these carriers to prove this entitlement. In addition, since the rule of restitution is one of general application and
has been held to apply to charges collected under agency orders, or,
as here, under tariffs filed with the Commission,170 there is further
justification in arguing for a cause of action based upon restitution.
But despite these arguments, the validity of restitution as a means
of preventing motor carriers from being unjustly enriched has been
175. Section 216(g) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970), pro•
vides that "the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed
changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice is just and reasonable."
176. The tariff publishing requirement relates to "rates" and "charges" and not to
increments thereof. 49 U.S.C. § 317 (1970). Similarly, the carriers' burden of proof
relates to the "proposed changed rate" and not merely to the incremental increase. 40
U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970). When a second rate, therefore, becomes effective, it supersedes
the first rate. However, since rates are constantly changed, it may be difficult to determine the precise date on which a general increase of all rates of a group of carriers
was superseded. On the other hand, it has been assumed, quite properly, that a new
general increase will surely have superseded a prior general increase. The shippers'
maximum recovery, therefore, spans the period between the two general increases. The
burden should be on the carriers to prove a lesser recovery is in order.
177. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
178. Id. at 184. The Report does not give any source of authority for the Commission to "specifically so provide."
179. See generally Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935); Baltimore
&: O.R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1928); Arkadelphia Milling Co, v. St,
Louis S. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1919).
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cast into doubt by three important cases, each involving a suit for
reparations,180 and one case now pending on appeal directly involving restitution.
In T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 181 the Supreme Court held that
a common-law right to reparation against motor carriers to recover
allegedly unreasonable past charges did not survive passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act. The rationale used by the Court to reach
this decision was that "because under the statutory scheme only the
I.C.C. could decide in the first instance whether any filed rate was
'unreasonable' either as to the past or future, any common law right
was necessarily extinguished as 'absolutely inconsistent' with recognition of the Commission's primary jurisdiction."182 The Court
adopted this rationale from its 1907 decision in Cotton Oil,183 a case
holding that the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act extinguished the common-law right to reparations against railroads.184
From these two decisions, it may be argued that restitution, a
common-law remedy which would produce an outcome similar to
that in a reparations suit, has also failed to survive the Act's passage.
This argument, however, fails to consider the limits placed by
the Court on Cotton Oil and T.I.M.E. Unlike the right to reparation, the right to restitution has been held, after Cotton Oil was
decided, to coexist with those rights established by the Interstate
Commerce Act.185 The Court made no suggestion to the contrary in
T.I.M.E.; and in its subsequent Hewitt-Robins186 decision-a case
involving damages for ~isrouting-the Court expressly limited the
180. Section 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), allows any
person claiming to have been damaged by a railroad's violations of the Act either to
make a complaint to the Commission or to bring suit in a district court. Section 16, 49
U.S.C. § 16 (1970), provides for enforcement of an ICC award of damages. The Supreme
Court held at a very early stage that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over
questions of the reasonableness of rates. Thus a shipper complaining of unreasonableness must litigate that issue before the ICC. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The other parts of the Act contain similar provisions on
claims for reparations. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 304a (1970) (motor carriers).
181. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
182. 359 U.S. at 473.
183. 359 U.S. at 473-74, citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426 (1907).
184. The shipper in Cotton Oil sought to assert the common-law right to reparation
in a state court on account of allegedly excessive and unreasonable railroad rates. The
Court held that the judicial exercise of such a power was "wholly inconsistent" with
the Commission's administrative power "of seeing to it that the statutory requirement
as to uniformity and equality of rates is observed," and with the Commission's own
authority to award reparation. 204 U.S. at 441.
185. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1929). In such cases,
the "cause of action for restitution is a type of the broader cause of action for money
had and received, a remedy which is equitable in origin and function." Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935).
186. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
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T.I.M.E. holding. It emphatically noted in Hewitt-Robins that
T.I.M.E. did not bar all common-law claims.187
The limits on T.l.M.E. are perhaps more comprehensible when
the procedural differences between restitution and reparation are
analyzed. In a reparations case, the shipper must prove the unreasonableness of past rates, a task that may result in a potential attack on
the current rate structure.188 Restitution, on the other hand, is more
similar to the cause of action for misrouting, allowed in HewittRobins, than to a reparations claim; for it involves no attack on existing, presumably lawful, rates. The Interstate Commerce Act requires
the carriers to prove the reasonableness of newly filed rates; and if
they have failed in that proof, the cause of action for restitution only
then comes into play.
In this respect, the Court's rationale for rejecting the continued
existence of reparations-that reparations suits would limit the Commission's primary jurisdiction-would not seem to apply to restitution. Since section 216(j) 189 of the Act preserves any such remedy
"not inconsistent" with the Act, and the primary test of whether a
cause of action survived the Act's passage "depends on the effect of
the exercise of the remedy upon the statutory scheme,"100 restitution
suits should be allowed. Restitution would complement the Commission's regulatory scheme, not interfere with it.
'While T.I.M.E. can thereby be distinguished from the typical
restitution case, a potentially more serious objection to restitution
can be traced to another aspect of the Commission's reparation
practice, as the Feinstein case191 illustrates. In 1956, the Commission held that certain railroads had not shown their separately
published loading and unloading charges, which were applicable
in the New York City area, to be just.and reasonable. 182 As a result,
a shipper promptly sought both reparation under section 9103 of the
Interstate Commerce Act and relief under indebitatus assumpsit on
187. 371 U.S. at 86-87.
For a more detailed discussion of T JM.E., see the court of appeals opinion in
Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212, 232-36 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
188. As a three-judge district court stated in National Motor Freight Assn. v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 92 & n.1. (D.D.C. 1967), the Supreme Court in T JM.E. dealt
with "past rates" or "reparations proceedings involving rates once effective under the
regulatory laws administered by the Commission."
189. 49 u.s.c. § 316G) (1970).
190. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962),
191. Feinstein v. New York Cent. R.R., 159 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
192. Unloading Charges on Fruits & Vegetables at N.Y. & Phila., 298 I.C.C. 63
(1956).
193. 49 u.s.c. § 9 (1970).
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the theory of unjust enrichment in an action brought before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Judge Learned Hand analogized the Commission's finding, that
the railroads had not shown the unloading charges to be just and
reasonable, to a decree for an injunction, which "speaks from the
date of its entry." 194 He added that in an injunction suit, "before
there can be an accounting for past profits or damages the court must
find that the defendant had been guilty in the past of the same
,vrong."19a The court was not satisfied that it wa~ hearing a suit for
damages that was "cognizable in all its aspects by the District
Court." 196 Thus, Judge Hand denied the relief sought, but stayed
dismissal of the section 9 claim pending application to the Commission for a finding of whether the rates charged and paid prior to the
date of the Commission's findings were just and reasonable.197 The
court dismissed the claim for indebitatus assumpsit, holding that the
Commission must "pass upon the invalidity of the charges before the
claim becomes absolute and is actionable at law at all." 198 The
shipper took no appeal, but proceeded to file a complaint with the
Commission under section 13(1)199 of the Interstate Commerce Act
and to assume the burden of showing that the pre-1956 rates were
unjust and unreasonable.200 The court's failure to grant restitution
seemingly restricts the availability of that form of relief.
Yet when closely examined, the Feinstein court's opinion is
clearly inconsistent with sections 15(7) and 216(g) 201 of the Interstate
Commerce Act. A Commission finding under these sections, that
rates have not been shown to be just and reasonable, speaks not from
the date of entry, but from the date of the order instituting the investigation. This is most clearly shown in section 15(7), which expressly provides for a refund from the beginning of the proceeding.
The final order under these sections, therefore, is not analogous to
a decree for an injunction, but more to a grant or denial of relief
requested by the carrier from its burden of proof. The final order
either approves the rates and sets aside the order of investigation, or
194. 159 F. Supp. at 463.
195. 159 F. Supp. at 463.
196. 159 F. Supp. at 463.
197. 159 F. Supp. at 467.
198. 159 F. Supp. at 467. The court also noted it had no diversity jurisdiction over
this claim, but because of this disposition did not discuss pendent jurisdiction. 159 F.
Supp. at 467.
199. 49 u.s.c. § 13(1).
200. William N. Feinstein &: Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 313 I.C.C. 783 (1961),
affd. sub nom. Feinstein v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 613 (S.DN.Y. 1962), affd., 317
F .2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963).
201. 49 u.s.c. §§ 15(7), 316(g) (1970).

1262

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '70:1223

disapproves the rates and confirms the doubts expressed in the order
of investigation.
There is a further fundamental error in Feinstein under sections
15(7) and 216(g). Both of these provisions treat the carrier's burden
of proof as a matter of substantive law. The Commission's finding in
1956, that the carriers had not shown the rates and charges to be just
and reasonable, should have been sufficient to render them unlawful
from the date of their effectiveness; for under the Act the carriers'
burden of proof was a substantive adjunct to the validity of those
rates and charges.202
To be sure, there are several cases in which the Commission has
found the same rates unlawful for the future but not for the past.
Yet each of these cases involved no determination relating to the
Commission's authority to have found those rates unlawful in the
past.
The decision most often miscited as standing for some limitation
on the Commission's authority is the Baer Brothers case.203 The portion of the opinion usually cited states:
That the two subjects of Reparation and Rates may be dealt with
in one order is undoubtedly true. . . . But awarding reparation for
the past and fixing rates for the future involve the determination of
matters essentially different. One is in its nature private and the
other public. One is made by the Commission in its quasi-judicial
capacity to measure past injuries sustained by a private shipper; the
other, in its quasi-legislative capacity, to prevent future injury to the
public.204
The sentence that follows the above quotation, however, is too often
overlooked. "But testimony showing the unreasonableness of a past
rate may also furnish information on which to fix a reasonable future
rate and both subjects can be, and often are, disposed of by the same
order." 205 In Baer Brothers, the Supreme Court only held that the
Commission's jurisdiction to award reparation is not limited to cases
202. In a different proceeding before a three-judge district court sitting in the
Southern District of New York, the court per Judge Friendly held that it could not
enjoin a rate that had become effective upon expiration of the suspension period, even
though the carriers had not sustained their burden under section 216(g) of showing the
tariff to be just and reasonable. He looked upon the shippers' request for an injunction
as a request for the court to reinstate an expired suspension order, National Small
Shipments Traffic Con£., Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 500 (1970). The court
apparently believed the Commission's investigation was incomplete, its hearings were
"not properly concluded," and the Commission should "resume" its investigation, 821
F. Supp. at 515-16. The court's final order and judgment of January 27, 1971, did in fact
direct the Commission "to resume its investigation with all practicable speed."
203. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver&: R.G.R.R., 233 U.S. 479 (1914).
204. 233 U.S. at 486.
205. 233 U.S. at 486.
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in which it also prescribes a future rate. The opm10n in Baer
Brothers suggested two reasons for distinguishing past rates from
future rates, but neither precludes a restitutory remedy. First, the
Commission may fix a future rate on application of nonshippers that
have no interest in obtaining reparation.206 Additionally, the Court
noted that the Commission should not deprive a shipper of an award
of reparation because of its own omission or inability to decide the
future rates; a shipper might be able "to prove unreasonableness as
to the past without being able to furnish evidence as to what would
be reasonable for the future." 207
Many of the cases in which the Commission itself has distinguished between past and future periods by prescribing a rate or
practice for the future, but refusing to award reparation, may be
explained in terms of burden of proof. In effect, the Commission has
held in those cases that if the burden was on the carrier, it must show
the proposed rate to be lawful in all respects, and if unlawful in one
respect it will be disapproved; and if the burden was on the shipper
to show past unreasonableness, the Commission may rely on a ground
for sustaining the past rate that is different from the ground it relied
on to find the rate unlawful for the future.208
The remaining refusals of the Commission to apply a finding
regarding a future period to a past period relate generally to the inapplicability of the future policy to the past period. When the order
relating to the future resulted in a leveling of rate disparities, which
increased some rates and reduced others, the Commission's refusal
to award reparation (to those whose rates were decreased for the
future) was sustained on appeal.209 And when the Commission required a general revision of the class rates, it refused reparation for
a period of five years while the railroads revised their rates. Only
after this period did it begin to order reparation in appropriate
cases.210
206. 233 U.S. at 487-88.
207. 233 U.S. at 488-89.
208. See, e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 287 I.C.C. 673,
679-80, 684, 685 (1953); Tri-State Packers' Assn. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 209 I.C.C. 192,
201 (1935). Similarly, when the Commission heard Feinstein, it refused to hold a
separate charge by the railroads for unloading excessive because the shippers had
assumed the burden of proof and new evidence was introduced concerning the reasonableness of the rates. William N. Feinstein &: Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 313 I.C.C. 783
(1961), afjd. sub nom. Feinstein v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
afjd., 317 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963).
209. ICC v. United States ex rel. Capital Grain&: Feed Co., 35 F.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1929) (beyond court's authority to grant mandamus ordering ICC to award reparation).
210. The problem is discussed and the cases are collected in William Volker&: Co. v.
Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 318 I.C.C. 249 (1962).
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From these examples, it would appear that the court in Feinstein
incorrectly interpreted the Commission's failure to delineate the
effect of its decision on the validity of past rates. Thus, when viewed
in this light, Feinstein, like T.I.M.E., creates no inference that a
right of restitution for unreasonable charges paid pursuant to a rate
increase subsequently cancelled by the Commission does not exist.
Recently, however, in United States v. Associated Transport,
Inc., 211 now pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the district court denied the existence
of a restitution remedy when the Commission had found that certain
rates were not shown to be just and reasonable. The court acted on
grounds similar to Feinstein without citing that opinion. It added
to the Feinstein rationale its view that T.I.M.E. precludes all relief
for the past except as expressly given shippers under section 204a,212
certainly giving that decision the broadest possible reading.
On the other hand, no cases have held that there is a right of
restitution on general principles of equity. To find such a remedy,
we must take note of the shippers' need for some method of recouping what they have paid in an unjustified rate increase, and the case
law that has developed in the area.
In procedural settings not dissimilar to those present in ICC cases,
there have been instances in which restitution has been granted. For
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has recognized that local utilities that were unable to justify rate
increases might be required to return moneys collected from rate
payers.213 In each case, the court reversed decisions of the regulatory
agencies, which had upheld the increases, and ordered the companies
either to make restitution or to segregate amounts collected pending
further hearings. The court found that no interference with any
211. 1972 FED. CARR. REP. (Carr. Cas.) ,r 82,316 (D.D.C. May 12, 1972), notice of appeal filed, D.C. Cir., July 12, 1972.
212. 49 U.S.C. § 304a (1970).
213. In Capital Transit Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 213 F.2d 176, 194-96 (D.C. Cir.)
(order amending judgment), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954), the court reversed rui
order that had permitted an electric power company to increase its rates, and directed
the district court to order the company to segregate all amounts collected from the
plaintiff customer by reason of the rate increase pending further hearings. In the
Second Bebchick case (Bebchick v. Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963)), the court en bane again reversed an order permitting an
increase in transit fares of a local bus company and required that "the amount realized
by Transit [the bus company] from the increase must be utilized for the benefit of
the class who paid it, that is, those who use Transit." 318 F.2d at 203 (supplemental
opinion). It required restitution of the amounts collected by the company through the
creation of a special fund on the books of the company for the "purpose of benefiting
Transit users in any rate proceedings pending or hereafter instituted," 318 F.2d at
204. See also Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Commn., 415 F.2d 900
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (a further application of the principle of restitution). The district
court in Associated Transport did not mention these cases.

June 1972]

Transport Rate Regulation

1265

statutory rate scheme would result if the utilities made refunds. 214
Refunds of increases that are found unjustified by the Interstate
Commerce Commission would seem even less to involve the question
of potential interference of the courts with a statutory rate scheme.
The Commission will already have found that the carriers have not
justified their rate increases before the court acts.
Other courts have granted relief to shippers to avoid unjust enrichment in cases in which an intervening court order prevented
rates from being reduced in compliance with an Interstate Commerce
Commission order.215 In one of these cases, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit stressed that a rate not shown to be just and
reasonable is unlawful, since the burden of proof requirement of the
statute is substantive in nature; 216 this rationale could support restitution in the complete absence of an interfering court order.
The availability of restitution after a Commission finding that a
general increase by motor carriers was unjustified has been before
three federal district courts. Only the court in American Transport
faced the issue directly, and its denial of recovery is b-eing appealed.
In two other cases, the courts granted relief to the shippers, albeit on
narrower grounds.217 Nevertheless, the rudiments of a cause of action
214. Bebchick v. Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d at 204 (supplemental opinion). See
Capital Transit Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 213 F.2d at 194-96 (order amending
judgment).
215. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971); Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc. v.
United States, unreported decision discussed in Middlewest, 433 F.2d at 228-29 (ordering
restitution of amounts collected in excess of ICC rate order during existence of
temporary restraining order, after dismissal of the carrier's complaint in 227 F. Supp.
815 (D. Vt.), afjd. mem., 379 U.S. 4 (1964)).
216. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d at 220-21. The
motor carriers relied on T .I.M.E. in their unsuccessful effort to bar any claim for restitution. 433 F.2d at 232-40. The court did not decide whether the increased rates were
unlawful from the date of their effectiveness. It expressly limited its holding to the
period following the cancellation order entered by the Commission since no broader
relief was requested by the parties. The only relief sought in the case was for a refund
of the amounts charged during the very brief period (Sept. 13-29, 1965) of the district
court's temporary restraining order. See 433 F.2d at 222. The Associated Transport court
apparently did not notice the limited relief requested in Middlewest, and read that
case as somehow recognizing "that the basic rate regulatory authority of the ICC is
prospective and not retrospective." 1972 FED. CARR. REP. (Carr. Cas.) ,i 82,316, at
55,477.
217. Admiral-Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D.
Colo. 1970), afjd., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral-Merchants
Motor Freight, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Both of these cases arose out of
a refund order of the Commission that was entered as a condition to the grant of a
postponement of time for the carriers to prepare their evidence in Increased Rates &
Charges, From, To & Between Middlewest Territory, 335 I.C.C. 142 (1969). However, as
the Commission and the Solicitor General stated before the Supreme Court in AdmiralMerchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. United States, "Had there been no refund order, the
Commission's finding that the carriers had not met their burden of proof would have
supported a shipper's cause of action for restitution." Government's Motion To Dismiss
or Affirm, at 7 n.6.
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for restitution are available in the decisions involving Commission
orders and in the precedents of the District of Columbia Circuit and
the Eighth Circuit. The signs thus point to the existence of the
restitution remedy.
VIII.

PRESERVATION OF INHERENT SERVICE ADVANTAGES
OF COMPETING MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

The omission within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act of any statement concerning refunds of unjustified rate increases
by motor carriers is but one illustration of the problems encountered
by the Commission. The National Transportation Policy218 creates
an equally perplexing challenge for the Commission in determining
the regulatory standard to be followed.
The Policy requires the Commission to "preserve the inherent
advantages" of all modes of transportation subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act, but fails to give clues to the meaning of this phrase.
In fact, the other provisions of the Act only further complicate the
situation. The Janus-like section 15a(3) 219 prohibits the Commission
from holding up rates to protect the traffic of any mode of transportation, yet also requires that "due consideration" be given "to the
objectives of the national transportation policy" under which it may
be necessary to hold up rates.
During the 1960's the Commission received the aid of judicial
interpretation in its quest to define "inherent advantage." In Ingot
Molds, 220 the Supreme Court sustained the Commission's disapproval
of certain railroad rate reductions, which the ICC had rejected to
protect the inherent cost advantages of certain bargeline carriers.
Obviously, more is yet to be said by the Commission concerning the
appropriate measure of the cost advantages of the various modes. 221
Relatively unexplored in the past decade has been the noncost comparisons among the modes. A few cases suggest the direction that
transportation law may take in this area, and what the continuing
role of the Commission ·will be.

A. Pre-1958 Cases
When the Director General was in charge of railroad operations
during the First World War, he began the Mississippi-Warrior River
218. 49 U.S.C. preceding § I (1970).
219. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1970).
220. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 5'11 (1971).
221. The matter is now pending in Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Proceedings,
No. 34013 (Sub-No. I) (I.C.C., initiated Feb. 5, 1969). See also Rose, Regulation of
Intermodal Rate Competition in Transportation, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1011 (1971).
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Barge Service and established many port-to-port rates at levels that
were eighty per cent of the all-rail rates between the ports.222 The
establishment of such differentials received congressional support in
1928 in the enactment of the Denison Act,223 which the Transportation Act of 1940 codified in its essential respects in section 307(d)224
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
In Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. United States,225 this policy
of intermodal rate differentials received judicial approval from the
Supreme Court as well. The more important aspect of the case,
however, can be found in the Court's approval of the criteria used
by the Commission in sustaining the differential. The Commission
had held that the joint rail-barge and rail-barge-rail rates in issue
should be lower than the corresponding all-rail rates although differences in costs did not justify the differentials. 226 The Court agreed
that the ICC was not required to base differentials solely on the relative costs of service of the competing modes. It stated:
Admittedly, barge service is worth less than rail service. It is slower,
.requires more handling and entails more risk. A shipper will pay
only what the service is worth to him. . • • The Commission is not
bound to require a rate as high for the inferior as for the superior
service.227
The Court also noted that the inherent advantage of rail carriers
shown here is superiority of service, and fixing a lower price for
the lesser service did not destroy the superior service.228
B. Post-1958 Cases

In Paint i:t Related Articles in Official Territory, 229 the Commission gave further recognition to the concept of service advantages.
It remarked that competition between the modes of transportation includes competition in both rates and service and that the
record before it indicated certain unenumerated service advantages
222. See generally Harbeson, Transport Coordination and the Rail Barge Question,
19 ICC PRAc. J. 765 (1952).
223. Ch. 891, 45 Stat. 978.
224. Ch. 722, tit. II, § 201, 54 Stat. 937 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 907(d) (1970)). The
second sentence of this section provides: "In the case of a through route, where one
of the carriers is a common carrier by water, the Commission shall prescribe such
reasonable differentials as it may find to be justified between all-rail rates and the
joint rates in connection with such common carrier by water."
225. 340 U.S. 216 (1951).
226. Rail 8: Barge Joint Rates, 270 I.C.C. 591 (1948). The differential was to be
absorbed by the bargeline in its division of the joint rail-barge rate.
227. 340 U.S. at 223.
228. 340 U.S. at 227.
229. 308 I.C.C. 439 (1959).
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in the protesting motor carriers that might enable them to compete
against the railroads' rate reductions without any reduction in their
own rates.230 In the reopened Gasoline and Fuel Oil proceeding,231
the Commission put this observation into practice by approving a
one-cent differential between rail and motor rates to points seventyfive miles or more from given rail origins. The differential was to be
effected by increasing motor rates. In Tobacco from North Carolina
to. Central Territory, 232 the Commission similarly found that the
motor carriers provide "faster and more flexible service," something
which is "of some importance" in the marketing of tobacco products.233 It noted that as a result of superior motor service, motor
movements may exceed rail movements despite a rail pricing advantage of seven cents. The Commission, however; reached the conclusion that both the rail and motor rate reductions should be disapproved to avert a "destructive rate war." 234
In two of the several Newsprint cases235 decided in the early
1960's, the Commission approved successive reductions in the rail
rates that at first narrowed, then eliminated, the ten per cent differential between the rail and barge rates. The Commission considered
the shipper's investment in barge-related facilities to be sufficient to
offset any service disadvantage over the barge route, and thus found
no justification for tp.e differential. 236 In another Newsprint case,231
the Commission-without discussion of inherent advantages-prescribed a differential of ten per cent between rail and barge rates to
permit the barge lines to compete for traffic between Tennessee and
Texas. But when the Commission, again without a discussion of inherent advantages, set a six per cent differential in piggyback rates
over sea-land rates, its decision was reversed in the New Haven case.238
In the New Haven litigation, the district court criticized both
the Commission's disregard of inherent advantages and the Com230. 308 I.C.C. at 450.
231. Gasoline &: Fuel Oil from Friendship, N.C. to Va. &: W. Va., 305 I.C.C. 6'13
(1959). For other cases in these years, see Harbeson, The Regulation of Interagency
Rate Competition Under the Transportation Act of 1958, 30 ICC PRAc, J. 287 (1962),
232. 309 I.C.C, 347 (1960),
233. 309 I.C.C. at 360.
234. 309 I.C.C. at 361.
235. Newsprint Paper from Tenn. &: Ala. to Baton Rouge, La,, 315 I.C.C. 117
(1961), afjd. sub nom. Igert v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ala. 1962); Newsprint
Paper from Calhoun, Tenn. to Baton Rouge, La., 310 I.C.C, 171 (1960).
236. 315 I.C.C. at 122-23; 310 I.C.C. at 179-80.
237. Newsprint Paper from Tenn.&: Ala. to Houston, Tex., 313 I.C.C. 669 (1961),
238. ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963), vacating and remanding
on other grounds 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), reversing Commodities-Pan•
Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23 (1960).
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mission's apparent reliance on value-of-service pricing.239 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, limited its discussion solely to the
Commission's disregard of inherent advantages. The Commission's
broad reliance on the effects of the rates on the national defense and
the country's commerce bore the brunt of the Court's criticism. The
Court, quoting from a congressional committee report, noted that
each mode should be permitted to assert its " 'inherent advantages,
whether they be of service or cost.' " 240 The Court stated that the
railroads are permitted "to respond to competition by asserting whatever inherent advantages of cost and service they possessed.''241 The
Court added: "If a carrier is prohibited from establishing a reduced
rate that is not detrimental to its own revenue requirements merely
because the rate will divert traffic from others, then the carrier is
thwarted from asserting its mm inherent advantages of cost and
service.''242 The Court's opinion carried the implication that a carrier should be permitted to reduce its rates to assert an inherent service advantage.
For the water carriers, the New Haven decision suggested that
inherent service advantages of all-rail service must be described in
explicit terms, not inferentially, if rate reductions for the railroads
were to be denied. In the Aluminum case,243 a water carrier thus
listed the all-rail advantages with which it had to compete in attempting to justify the rate differential it then enjoyed.244 The disabilities
inherent in water transportation, which necessitated a rate differential benveen the all-rail and rail-water-rail carriers competing for
aluminum traffic, were noted by the district court to include
perils of the sea, infrequency of sailings, longer time in transit, lack
of diversion and stop-off privileges in transit, bunching of cars at the
interchanges, restrictions on size of cars handled, labor difficulties
and strikes affecting coastwise shipping, and an embargo requiring
shippers to obtain a permit before cars are supplied for movement in
[water carrier] service.24o
The district court found these factors to he convincing evidence of
disabilities that would require the water carrier to maintain rates
lower than those for all-rail service.
239. 199 F. Supp. at 641, 642-43.
240. 372 U.S. at 756, quoting S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
241. 372 U.S. at 757.
242. 372 U.S. at 759.
243. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1964).
244. 233 F. Supp. at 208. The railroads had attempted to narrow the differential by
reducing the all-rail through rate while continuing to maintain higher local rates on
routes to and from the ports involved in rail-water-rail transportation.
245. 233 F. Supp. at 208.
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That New Haven's statement concerning a service advantage was
not to be taken literally can be inferred from the Court's decision in
Ingot Molds. 246 There the railroads sought unsuccessfully to reduce their rates on iron ingots moving from Pittsburgh to Steelton,
Kentucky to the level of rates charged by a competing barge-truck
operation. The case turned on the Commission's adherence to a fully
distributed, rather than out-of-pocket, cost comparison between the
modes in determining which had the inherent cost advantage; but in
sustaining the Commission, the Supreme Court specifically reversed
the district court's reliance on the railroads' efforts to match the
barge-truck rate. The Court suggested that the lower court had
overlooked "the uncontroverted evidence that given equal rates all
traffic would move by train," and added, "[g]iven a service advantage,
it seems somewhat unrealistic to suggest that rate parity does not
result in undercutting the competitor that does not possess the service advantage."247
In this regard, it is also interesting to note the stand taken by
the Department of Justice, which in this case served as the Commission's antagonist. The Department argued that New Haven stood for
the proposition that a carrier may reduce its own rates to any level
that was compensatory in terms of its own revenue requirements
unless "competing modes show that their inherent cost and service
advantages will be unduly impaired or destroyed."248 The remark
was not relevant to the facts before the Court, for the carriers reducing their rates possessed the service advantage, but not the cost advantage. But the Department did seem to recognize, unlike the New
Haven opinion, that the possession of a service advantage does not
measure ability to reduce rates, but rather to hold them up. 240
Although the railroads have been reluctant to admit, especially in
cases concerning motor transportation competition, that a service
advantage requires higher rates, there is at least one area of intermodal competition-that involving common carrier pipelines-in
which they readily take this position.
As early as 1922, the service advantages possessed by the pipelines
became apparent to the Commission. At that time the Commission
held that a pipeline carrier might require of shippers a minimum
246. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968),
247. 392 U.S. at 593.
248. Brief for the United States at 7, American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville
&: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968). The Department parted with the Commission over
whether out-of-pocket costs or full costs should determine which mode had an
inherent cost advantage over the other.
249. Conceivably, if the Commission had decided the New Haven case in tenns of
inherent service advantages, the Supreme Court might have written an entirely different
opinion and perhaps have sustained the Commission.
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tender of 10,000 barrels at any one time, but that a minimum-tender
requirement exceeding 10,000 barrels, except in special circumstances, would be unreasonable.250 The pipelines in these early proceedings asked for minimums of up to 100,000 barrels, arguing that
the efficient operation of their lines, particularly in view of the heavy
initial capital costs, required a promise of minimum tenders from
their shippers.
In more recent years, many pipelines have alleviated their published minimums by allowing shippers to aggregate their tenders,
either from a number of shippers or from a number of plants of one
shipper. When one pipeline sought to reduce the effect of the minimum even further by allowing one week to complete the minimum
shipment, the railroads protested, arguing:
The inherent advantage of pipeline operation is the transportation
of liquids in large volume. This advantage is lost when shipments are
received for transportation in small quantities. . . . Dissipation by
Mid-America [a carrier by pipeline] of its inherent advantage in the
handling of volume quantities unfairly exposes the railroads to loss
of competitive traffic which they are best equipped to handle.251
However, the Commission approved the pipeline's proposed change
so that shippers, "especially the smaller ones," would benefit, and
thereby dismissed the railroads' effort to thwart a tariff rule "peculiarly adapted" to the pipeline's operating methods merely on
grounds of "competitive disadvantage." 252
C.

The Continuing Role of the Commission

The Ingot Molds opinion corrected the faulty language of New
Haven and returned the law of inherent service advantages to the
stream of precedents that has developed since the early years of regulation. The congressional choice to "preserve" service advantages between competing modes of transportation reflects in part a decision
that competition between the modes should not rest solely on their
relative costs of operation.
Broadly speaking, the preservation of a service advantage today
means that the carrier possessing the advantage should not be permitted to reduce its rates below the level necessary to attract the
250. Brundred Bros. v. Prairie Pipe Line Co., 68 I.C.C. 458 (1922) (decided by a
division of three members of the Commission). The 10,000 barrel rule was later adopted
by the entire Commission in Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C.
115, 136 (1940), affd., 272 I.C.C. 375, 382-83 (1948).
251. Brief for Southwestern &: Western Trunk Line Rail Carriers at 43, Pipeline
Demurrage & Minimum Shipment Rules on Propane, 315 I.C.C. 443 (1962).
252. Pipeline Demurrage & Minimum Shipment Rules on Propane, 315 I.C.C. 443,
448 (1962).
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traffic. Unlike a cost advantage, a service advantage is preserved by
keeping up the rates of the carrier possessing the advantage. Such a
carrier would only dissipate the advantage if it charged rates that
were equal to or less than those of the carrier that lacked the advantage. It might be argued that the preservation of service advantages
by keeping rates up also, unfortunateiy, preserves the service disadvantages of the disadvantaged carrier. The proponents of such an
argument assume that the disadvantaged carrier should be permitted
to go out of business. The more accurate characterization of the
result reached by the statute is that the preservation of service
advantages preserves the disadvantaged carrier along with its service
disadvantages, a result that Congress intends under the National
Transportation Policy.
This congressional mandate has not led to the protection of
carriers disadvantaged by poor management or inferior equipment.253 The essential ingredients of the disadvantage have generally
been factors and circumstances beyond the control of the disadvantaged carrier. The disadvantaged carrier must also have qualified as
a member of a class entitled to the protection of the National Transportation Policy.254 Keeping these factors in mind, the Commission
continues its important function in appropriate cases of prescribing
differentials to preserve inherent service advantages between competing modes of transportation.
IX.

THE EXPANSION OF INTERMODAL JOINT RATES

From the earliest years of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
Commission accepted for filing in the public tariffs joint rates in
which railroads in the United States and those in the adjacent foreign
countries of Canada and Mexico participated. For example, as early
as 1888, the Commision recognized that tariffs might be filed by
railroads "jointly with one or more other carriers" on foreign-bound
shipments.255 Its jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act
over such rates was later sustained in the courts.2G6
For three quarters of a century, however, the Commission would
not accept joint tariffs filed by railroads and ocean carriers; from the
253. See Excursion Fares Betlveen Chicago, Ill. &: Minneapolis, St. Paul &: Rochester,
Minn., 178 I.C.C. 742, 745 (1931).
254. See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 5'11, 593
(1968).
255. In re Publication of Export Tariffs, 1 I.C.C. 658 (1888),
256. See Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 385 U.S. 182 (1966); H. K,
Porter Co. v. Central Vermont Ry., 366 U.S. 272 (1961). Section l(l)(a) of the Act, 49
U.S.C. § l(l}(a) (1970), gives the Commission jurisdiction over rail transportation "from
or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign country, but only insofar as
such transportation ••• takes place within the United States."
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outset, it required that whenever a "gross sum" was agreed upon between railroads and ocean carriers for transportation of a shipment
to a foreign country, "in every case" the railroad tariff filed with the
Commission must show that portion of the charge applicable to the
land transportation. 257 Similarly, the Commission would not accept
joint tariffs filed by railroads and motor carriers exempt from federal
economic regulation. The Commission changed these practices in
the 1960's and began to accept both types of rates for filing. In so
doing, it encouraged new forms of intermodal cooperation.
A.

The 1920 Amendment of Section l(l)(a)

As originally enacted in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act conferred jurisdiction over transportation "from any place in the United
States to an adjacent foreign country," when the traffic originated
in the United States.258 Senator Cullom explained that to regulate
interstate commerce "fairly and effectively it has been deemed necessary to extend its application also to certain classes of foreign commerce which are intimately intermingled with interstate commerce,
such as shipments bet:1v-een the United States and adjacent countries
by railroad . . . ." 259
The subject of transportation was again before the Congress in
1920. The Transportation Act of 1920 amended the Act to read:
"from or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign country, but only in so far as such transportation ... takes place within
the United States."260
There was no legislative history to explain the removal of the
word "adjacent." The Commission had only requested that the Congress amend the statute so that it would include transportation both
"to and from" an adjacent country.261 As a result, the Commission
continued to read the statute as if "adjacent" were still present. The
Commission apparently did not question whether the congressional
reasons for originally limiting its jurisdiction over foreign commerce remained pertinent.
The Commission's position suited both the railroads and the ocean
carriers, neither of which seemed at all interested in establishing
joint rates. Under the Commission's interpretation, the railroads
257. I I.C.C. at 659.
258. Ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379. See Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Western Pac. R.R., 251
F. 218 (9th Cir, 1918); Lykes S.S. Co. v. Commercial Union, 13 I.C.C. 310 (1908); Ullman
v. Adams Express Co., 14 I.C.C. 340 (1908).
259, 17 CoNG. REc. 3472 (1886).
260. Ch. 91, § 400, 41 Stat. 474 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970)).
261. Hearings on H.R. 4378 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 10 (1919).
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could still remain parties to voluntary arrangements that provided
for continuous carriage of goods between an interior point within
the United States and a nonadjacent foreign country; and the ocean
carriers, freed from regulation, could change their rates at will. 202
The limitation the Commission placed upon its jurisdiction extended beyond rail-ocean joint rates. Using its rail-ocean policy as
a model for determining the extent of its authority, the Commission
explained in 1935 that "upon this line of reasoning it has been our
ruling that joint rates cannot be made benveen carriers subject to
the act and those not subject to the act." 263 With such a narrow interpretation of its authority, the Commission effectively foreclosed
the possibility of joint rates benveen railroads and the numerous
exempt motor carriers.
B.

The Re-examination of the 1920 Amendment

The re-examination of the Commission's position, however, was
triggered more by the potential growth in rail-ocean container movements and the wholly new interest of the Department of Transportation in what it called "trade simplification"264 than by the limitation
on joint rates benveen railroads and exempt motor carriers. Since
there had been no relevant legislative history surrounding the 1920
amendment to section 1(1), with these new developments staff of the
Commission began to question Congress' purpose in removing the
word "adjacent." One clue to the meaning of this change seemed now
to lie in the proper interpretation of a forty-year old decision of the
Supreme Court, which had been virtually forgotten.
In Missouri Pacific R.R. v. United States,265 the Supreme Court
held that the Commission possessed jurisdiction to prescribe the form
of a railroad's bill of lading issued in connection with a shipment
that would later be transported by a foreign-flag ocean carrier. It
262. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I.C.C, 266,
279-80 (1908).
263. Drayage 8: Unloading at Jefferson City, Mo., 206 I.C.C. 436, 440-41, citing
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I.C.C. 266 (1908). The
Commission stated that in such a joint arrangement it could not "control" the rates
and practices of both parties. It added, a few years later, "that the absence of power
to regulate all carriers parties to joint rates would in effect, render void our power
to regulate such joint rates." Interchange of Traffic at Point of Origin, 46 M.C.C. 623,
626 (1946).
264. In 1968, bills entitled "The Trade Simplification Act of 1968" were introduced
providing for the filing of joint rates by surface, water, and air carriers. S. 3235, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 16023, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). A representative of the
Administration said that the Commission had refused to accept joint rates filed by
railroads in which ocean carriers had joined. See Hearings on S. 3235 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-78, at 18 (1968).
265. 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
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read the Commission's power to prescribe bills of lading266 to be "a
general rule" that must be enforced against all carriers subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act, even if a portion of the through movement
in which the railroad voluntarily participated was not subject to the
Act. 267 Missouri Pacific thus suggested that the Act also could be
extended to cover voluntary joint rates of railroads and ocean carriers.
In addition to the innuendoes of Missouri Pacific, the Commission found a repealed section of the Interstate Commerce Act
relevant in deciding whether its continued use of the "adjacent"
limitation was proper. Congress had required in the Transportation
Act of 1920 that the domestic-flag ocean carriers file schedules and
routes with the Commission; list the rates that applied from a given
port, upon request from a railroad; and reserve space if the railroad
accepted the rate.268 It further authorized railroads to issue through
bills of lading. The new section was given little use269 and was repealed in 1940;270 but even then the Commission's jurisdiction
over foreign commerce authorized it to compel railroads that chose
to enter into through arrangements with one or a selected few ocean
carriers271 to enter into "similar arrangements" with other ocean
carriers.
On the basis of these statutory changes, and the Supreme Court's
holding in Missouri Pacific, the Commission concluded in the 1960's
that not only had Congress removed the word "adjacent" from section l(l)(a) for the purpose of promoting intermodal arrangements
that would be subject to Commission regulation, but it had also for
a twenty-year period made some of these arrangements mandatory
and subject to the close supervision of the Commission. By 1940, the
Congress had returned to a policy of encouraging voluntary intermodal arrangements subject to the Commission's supervision. The
266. Under § 1(6) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(6) (1970).
267. 273 U.S. at 345.
268. Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was added by the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 441, 41 Stat. 497, was drafted by Senator Cummins, who
explained that it was "an effort to coordinate land and ocean traffic" by requiring
railroads to distribute sailing information throughout the country and to issue through
bills of lading in a form prescribed by the Commission, "thus affording the inland
shipper who desires to export an opportunity properly to route and ship his freight."
59 CONG. REc. 140, 143 (1919).
269. The section was described as "unnecessary" (H.R. REP. No. 2832, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940)), and a section that had "never been of much value" (S. REP. No. 433,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1939)).
270. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 14, 54 Stat. 919.
271. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 8(d), 54 Stat. 910 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 6(12) (1970)).
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Commission's awareness of this policy in the 1960's led to new efforts
by the Commission to promote intermodal traffic.
C.

The New Intermodal Joint Rates

In April 1969, the Commission advised Congress that it possessed authority under existing law to accept tariffs establishing joint
rates in which common carriers subject to its jurisdiction and ocean
carriers outside its jurisdiction would participate.272 On July 31,
1969, it initiated a proceeding to determine whether such rates
should be permitted and, if so, what changes would be necessary in
the Commission's rules to permit these tariffs to be filed. The proceeding resulted in a report of the entire Commission, which was
issued on September 4, 1970.273
The Commission stated in this proceeding that, notwithstanding
the 1920 amendment of the statute, which removed the word "adjacent," it had continued to read the statute "as if that word were
still present."274 It confessed "that this self-imposed restriction on
jurisdiction over tariffs of joint rates was unfounded," and declared
that it would now accept such rates for filing in the public tariffs.271i
If such rates ·were filed, the Commission stated, it would enter such
orders as might be necessary only against the domestic carriers subject to its authority, and not against, for example, ocean carriers.270
Since the Commission's refusal to approve rail-exempt-motorcarrier joint rates was predicated upon the Commission's former
attitude toward joint ocean-rail rates, its new decision logically led
to a re-examination of its stand on such rail-motor tariffs. Thus,
when the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company
proposed to publish tariff provisions that temporarily authorized it
to substitute motor carrier service for rail service on grain shipments
from various points in Oklahoma to Enid, Oklahoma, the Commission, permitting a departure from its long-standing practice,277
stated that the Act
272. Tariffs Containing Joint Rates & Through Routes for the Transportation of
Property Betlveen Points in the United States & Points in Foreign Countries, 38'1
1.C.C. 625, 625-26 (1970).
273. 337 I.C.C. 625.
274. 337 I.C.C. at 628.
275. 337 I.C.C. at 629.
276. 337 I.C.C. at 629. Orders may be issued only against domestic carriers since 49
U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970) limits the Commission's jurisdiction over foreign commerce only
"insofar as such transportation takes place within the United States."
277. In Substituted Freight Service, 232 I.C.C. 683, 688 (1939), and Substituted
Service-Charges & Practices of For-Hire Carriers & Freight Fonvarders (Piggyback
Serv.), 322 I.C.C. 301, 354 (1964), the Commission had said that railroads may not
enter into through-route, joint-rate arrangements with exempt motor carriers, and that
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authorizes the filing of substituted service tariffs contemplating an arrangement voluntarily entered into between railroads and partially
exempt motor carriers where the shipments ,;vill move on rail billing
and the railroad remains responsible for the entire through movement.278
Consequently, the Commission approved the railroad's proposal to
use whatever exempt motor carriers it could find to perform the
transportation, to issue its own bill of lading for the transportation,
and to omit the motor carriers' names in the applicable tariff.
In another recent proceeding, the Commission has approved the
filing of through-route, joint-rate arrangements between railroads
and exempt motor carriers, this time on a broader scale and for
longer or relatively permanent periods. The Commission has found
that such joint rates are in the interest of the shipping public and
are "consistent with the purposes of the act and our now-established
jurisdiction to entertain such rates so long as they are filed by regulated carriers and the exempt carriers are named in the tariff." 279
From this, it would appear that there is every indication that the
Commission will condone the increased intermodal use of joint-rate
tariffs in the future.

X.

CONCLUSION

The regulation of transport rates has never rested on formulas,
rules of thumb, or simplistic phrases, such as "cost-based rates." The
"process of rate-making is essentially empiric"; the Interstate Commerce Act charges the agency with "the duty of being responsive to
the dynamic character of transportation problems."280 The decade
of the 196O's was indeed a period of many rapid changes in transportation rates, and the task of fulfilling this mandate was complex.
The railroad industry in particular experienced the effect of the
Commission's activity. There were marked changes in its rate structure as the tendency of the rail rate structure continued to move
all motor carriers employed in substituted service must be named in the applicable
tariff.
When the Commission had held at the beginning of the decade that it lacked
jurisdiction to accept the joint rates filed by motor carriers in cooperation with ocean
carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Commission (Motor Carrier
Operation in Hawaii, 84 M.C.C. 5, 31 (1960)), Congress had obliged by following the
ICC recommendation and enacting clarifying legislation in 1962 to permit the filing of
such rates. Act of Aug. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-595, 76 Stat. 397 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 216(c)(l970)).
278. Substitution of Motor Carrier Service for Rail Service-Grain, Special Permission No. 69-4969 (l.C.C. June 3, 1969).
279. Substitution of Motor For Rail Serv. &: Publication of Joint Motor-Rail Rates
on Grains, 341 I.C.C. 88, 101 (1972).
280. Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942).
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away from value-oriented rates and more toward cost-oriented rates 281
and volume rate reductions. In addition, the railroads suffered a
noticeable reduction in capacity, which was reflected in the purchase
of specially equipped and large-capacity railroad cars which were
largely unavailable for general service. When the Commission has
been dissatisfied with these tendencies, it has adopted regulations to
change their course.282
The Commission's activity was evident also in the development
of general transportation policy. The Interstate Commerce Act requires that rates be "just" and "reasonable," that the discriminations
not be "undue," and that the "inherent advantages" of different
modes be preserved. These policies are not precisely defined; rather,
their meaning has been developed by the Commission over years of
regulatory effort. It has often been necessary for the Commission to
reconcile many conflicting interests in developing these policies,
something which could not be achieved with strict adherence to cost.
Furthermore, a policy of strict adherence to cost would have destroyed the policies relating to maximizing traffic through the various
ports and would not have settled questions related to the preservation of the inherent service advantages of the various modes. The
cost of transportation, therefore, was neither an automatic nor a
complete answer to the problem of providing transportation to the
shippers of the country at reasonable rates.
As for motor carriers, the trend in this industry now tends toward
the closer regulation of profits, and there has also been the appearance of a new potential avenue of relief from unjust interim payment
of rate increases. The former is the work of the Commission; the
latter can only be accomplished by the courts. In addition, there is
new hope for greater intermodal cooperation, which should result
in new rate reductions.
I would hope that in view of the Commission's diligent work in
rate regulation, if I have not shown that the Commission must be
acquitted of the crime charged by the Study Group Report, at least
I have shown that the case is for the jury.
281. A study prepared for the Department of Commerce concluded in 1966 that
the Commission's regulatory trend was "strongly in the direction of cost-based rates"
and that future public policy could reasonably result in "less, the same, or more
intensity of regulation, freedom for pricing initiative, and the use of costs in pricing."
SYSTEMS .ANALYSIS AND REsEARCH CORPORATION, COST-BASED FREIGHT-RATES: DESIMDIUTY
AND FEASIBILITY 103, 128 (1966).

282. See, e.g., Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, 337 I.C.C. 217 (1970), modified,
339 I.C.C. 627 (1971), afjd. sub nom. Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp.
490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), revd. in part sub nom. Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 322
F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Fla. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972)
(No. 70-279).

